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An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate
Law and Corporate Bankruptcy
DavidA Skeel, Jr.

51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325 (1998)

In this Article, ProfessorSkeel argues that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law
has neglected a crucial component of corporategovernance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciatingthe complementary relationship between corporate law and corporatebankruptcy can we understand how corporategovernance operatesin any given nation.
To show this, the Article contrasts American corporate governance
with that of Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate
governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework incudes
a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that
characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast,
requires a much harsher bankruptcy regime. Drawing on recent insights in
corporate finance, the Article contends that a permanent change in the
corporategovernance approach (such as the increase in relationalgovernance
in the United States that some commentators have advocated) would lead to a
correspondingchange in corporatebankruptcy, and vice versa.
In order to understand why American corporategovernance differs so
dramatically from that of Japan and Germany, the Article explores the
evolution of corporate governance in the three countries in historical and
political terms. Based on an analysis of interest group activity, as well as
structural and ideological factors, the Article predicts that corporate
governance patterns will remain surprisingly stable in each of the three
countries,despite the increasinginternationalizationof markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The current decade has witnessed the rise in corporate law
scholarship of a new, political account of corporate law. Like most
existing corporate law scholarship, the new account focuses on the
characteristic dilemma in American corporate governance: the fact
that shareholders of publicly held firms are often too widely dispersed
to effectively monitor the firm's managers. This separation of ownership and control, which was most famously documented by Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means in the early 1930s,' has long been
attributed to economic necessity. In the traditional account, firms'
need for enormous amounts of new capital at the end of the
nineteenth century required them to attract the savings of vast
numbers of investors, who necessarily delegated control to a
professional class of managers.

1.
See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
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The great contribution of the new wave in corporate law
scholarship has been to demonstrate that the characteristic pattern
we see in U.S. corporations stems as much from political factors as
from economic necessity. By carefully exploring the historical
development of American corporate law, Mark Roe and others have
shown that legislative restrictions on banks and other financial
institutions have played an important role in fragmenting the
ownership of American firms. 2 In their comparative mode, these
scholars have pointed out that large shareholders actively monitor the
managers of Japanese and German firms, underscoring the possibility
that things might have developed differently in the United States. 3
This new scholarship has already offered enormous insights
into American corporate governance, yet it has almost completely
neglected a critical component of corporate law: the role of corporate
bankruptcy. 4 Only by considering the relationship between corporate
law and corporate bankruptcy can we fully understand how corporate
law functions in the United States, and why American corporate law
differs so dramatically from its counterparts in Japan, Germany, and
other nations.
Based on this insight, this Article attempts to develop a more
complete explanation of the mechanisms of corporate law than the
existing literature offers.5 The analysis will operate, in a sense, at
two different levels. At an abstract level, the Article will develop a
general theory of corporate law, which takes into account both corporate governance-broadly construed to include political as well as
legal factors, and the way managers and other constituencies respond
to them 6-and corporate bankruptcy. In particular, it will argue that

2.
Roe, who has been the most prominent exponent of the political account, recently published an influential book based on a series of earlier articles. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994) [hereinafter ROE, STRONG MANAGERS].

3.
The occasion for much of this analysis has been the increasing concentration of
American stock in the hands of institutional investors, and the question whether institutional
investor activism will alter the traditional pattern of strong managers and passive shareholders.
For further discussion and citations to the literature, see infra notes 247-53 and accompanying
text.
4.
The neglect is especially puzzling with Mark Roe, given that he wrote several important articles on bankruptcy issues earlier in his career. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and
Debt: A New Model for CorporateReorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
5.
For earlier works by the Author emphasizing the importance to corporate law of
corporate bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in
Chapter11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) [hereinafter Skeel, Nature]; David
A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between CorporateLaw and CorporateBankruptcy, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 471 (1994) [hereinafter Skeel, Rethinking].
6.
This Article will focus on the institutional environment as a whole, or what Lance
Davis and Douglass North have characterized as "the set of fundamental political, social and
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corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy complement one
another, such that changes in firms' characteristic approach to corporate governance in any given country will provoke changes in corpo7
rate bankruptcy, and vice versa.
To show this, the Article will focus on corporate governance
patterns in the United States, on the one hand, and in Japan and
Germany on the other, which stand at opposite ends of the corporate
governance spectrum.8 In the United States, corporate governance is
characterized by relatively passive shareholders, 9 well-developed
managerial labor markets, and market correctives such as hostile
takeovers, combined with a bankruptcy framework that permits the
managers of distressed firms to attempt a reorganization. I refer to
this approach as an "ex post" system, due to the after-the-fact nature
In Japan and Germany, by contrast, large
of the correctives.
shareholders such as banks, rather than hostile takeovers, typify
corporate governance, managerial labor markets are comparatively
thin, and managers are immediately displaced if a firm files for
bankruptcy. I refer to this approach as an "ex ante" system. 10
The argument that corporate law and bankruptcy are complementary suggests that if U.S. governance combined active takeover
markets with a bankruptcy law that, as in Japan and Germany,
legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution." LANCE
E. DAvis & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 6 (1971).
The Article will sometimes use "corporate law" as a synonym for corporate governance-that
is, to connote not just the background laws, but also the governance patterns the parties adopt.
Also, although I distinguish throughout the Article between corporate governance (or corporate
law) and corporate bankruptcy for expositional purposes, the larger point is, of course, that corporate bankruptcy is a component of corporate governance.
7.
As discussed in much more detail in Part I1.C, I borrow the concept of complementarity from important recent work in the corporate finance literature. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure and OrganizationalChange in
Manufacturing,19 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1995).
8.
Although I focus on the United States, Japan, and Germany both because of my own
familiarity with American corporate law and because Japan and Germany offer a vivid contrast,
the analysis is intended to be general in application. I elaborate on this, and offer brief comments on Canada, France, and Great Britain in the conclusion to the Article.
9.
I say "relatively' because institutional shareholders have taken a more active stance
in recent years.
10. The terms "ex post" and "ex ante" roughly parallel what some commentators have
characterized as "market-centered" and "bank-centered" systems. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 327, 328 (1996). For evidence that other aspects of Japanese regulation also have an ex
ante focus as compared to the U.S., see Hideki Kanda, Politics,Formalism,and the Elusive Goal
of Investor Protection: Regulation of StructuredInvestment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 569, 584-85 (1991) (ex ante emphasis of Japanese administrative law).
My use of the term "system" is meant to be metaphorical only. I do not attribute intentional
qualities to the systems, as some recent scholars have done in other contexts. See, e.g., Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing the liability "system").
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immediately displaced managers, the managers of healthy firms
would have an incentive to encourage investors to acquire large,
stable stakes in American firms, and investors could expect profits
from assembling such stakes. Similarly, if Japanese and German
firms shifted toward American shareholding patterns, we could expect
to see an analogous shift in their bankruptcy regimes.
As this description suggests, my theory does not assert that
lawmakers will necessarily alter the legal frameworks of corporate
law and corporate bankruptcy at the same time and in complementary fashion. Instead, it suggests that firms' overall approach to corporate law, including both the regulatory background and managers'
and investors' responses to it, is integrally related to the nature of the
corresponding bankruptcy regime.
One way to test this framework will be to see if its predictions
hold true in the future-that is, if changes in a nation's corporate
governance are accompanied by changes in corporate bankruptcy and
vice versa. The best way to shed light on why American corporate
governance looks so different from the approaches in Japan and
Germany, however, and to make predictions about whether we can
expect to see substantial change, is to explore the historical antecedents of the patterns we see now. Once the general theory has been
developed, the Article moves to this second, more particularized level
of analysis.
The Article focuses in most detail on the institutional
factors-interest group activity, structural constraints,
and
ideology-that have helped to produce the characteristic pattern of
U.S. corporate governance: the Berle-Means corporation in corporate
governance and manager-driven, negotiated reorganization in
bankruptcy. On the corporate law side, much of this story has been
told in the important recent work described at the outset of the
Article. What has not been explained is how corporate reorganization
emerged in this country, and how its emergence relates to the
development of corporate law.
As with the Berle-Means corporation, it was not at all inevitable that U.S. law would evolve toward a manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy regime. Until the railroad failures of
the nineteenth century, financial distress routinely meant liquidation.
Reorganization might never have developed if institutional factors
had not prevented Congressional intervention. Railroad failures
prompted the creation of a judicial reorganization technique known as
equity receivership, which only later gave way to legislative regulation of corporate reorganization. Legislative regulation occurred in
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two very different steps during the New Deal and took its current
form as a result of a series of events beginning in the 1950s. 11
In each of these accounts, the story is one of adaptive evolution. Changes in the relevant legal regimes have been central, but
managers' and investors' responses to these changes prove equally
salient. 12
From the interplay between the parties and the
institutional context in which they operate, we see the characteristic
patterns of ex ante (in Japan and Germany) and ex post (in the United
States) governance develop.
After describing the emergence of ex post governance in the
U.S., the Article offers a more concise account of the developments
responsible for the very different ex ante approaches that characterize
Japanese and German corporate governance. The discussion suggests
that historical and political influences have played similarly
important roles in both Japan and Germany.
The historical analysis leads to several additional issues. One
is the question of whether the American ex post approach and the ex
ante systems in Japan and Germany are likely to be stable; or
whether we can expect them to converge over time. Although some
commentators predict that the continued expansion of international
markets will blur the existing distinctions in corporate governance,
this Article's analysis of various institutional factors suggests that the
respective systems will remain surprisingly stable.
This is not to say that one of the two systems is now and will
continue to be superior to the other. Both approaches appear
generally to be efficient and to have characteristic biases. For instance, ex ante governance eliminates the costs of a manager-driven,
ex post reorganization process and may enhance the information
exchange between managers and shareholders, but it can also chill
managerial risk-taking and adaptation to changing technologies. Ex
post governance encourages risk-taking, but may also lead to excessive risk and related problems, such as inadequate investment by
11. Interestingly, and in contrast to the political history of corporate governance, the single most important interest group in American bankruptcy law has been lawyers. Throughout
the equity receivership period, reorganization practice was centered on a small, elite segment of
the Wall Street bar. One of the most dramatic effects of the New Deal bankruptcy reforms was
to transform the nature of bankruptcy practice in ways that continue to resonate.
12. This Article's emphasis on managers' and investors' response to an existing legal
regime illustrates an important distinction between evolutionary theory in biology and in law.
Legal evolution is less "random," since human actors can consciously reflect on the institutional
environment to which they are responding. See generally E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985). See also Larry E. Ribstein, Politics,
Adaptation and Change in Corporate Law 4-6 (1998) (unpublished draft, on file with author). As
will become clear, intentionality plays a crucial role in the evolutionary theory of this Article.
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employees in firm-specific human capital. This Article argues that
the two approaches (and variations between these poles) are best seen
not as efficient or inefficient, but as alternative mechanisms for
13
enhancing going-concern value.
This Article's conclusions as to the stability and respective
merits of the two systems have important implications for the recent
calls for U.S. lawmakers to emulate Japanese and German-style
governance, and for Japan and Germany to adopt aspects of the
American system. Most obviously, adjustments to one element of
corporate governance-such as inducements for relational shareholding in U.S. firms or the adoption of U.S.-style corporate
reorganization in Germany-are unlikely to take hold absent corresponding changes to the remainder of the system. Therefore the
efforts in recent years by teams of lawyers and academics to export
aspects of American corporate or bankruptcy law are unlikely to be
successful. On the other hand, cross-fertilization of this sort has on
occasion produced fruitful results, and failed efforts are often more
ineffectual than harmful.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the political
account of American corporate governance and the very different
governance patterns in Japan and Germany, and develops my theory
as to the complementarity of corporate law and corporate bankruptcy;
Parts III and IV provide a historical analysis of how ex post
governance emerged in the United States, whereas firms in Japan
and Germany gravitated toward ex ante governance-focusing in
particular on the development of an ex post bankruptcy regime in the
United States; and Part V considers the stability of the respective
systems and the question of whether one or the other is superior.
II. THE CORPORATE LAW/BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
The standard economic account of American corporate law
characterizes the publicly held corporation as a nexus of contracts. 14
This account has encouraged theorists to focus less on the corporate
13. This is a good place to note an important caveat. It remains unclear how large an effect any given corporate governance framework has on economic performance. Technological
changes and external shocks almost certainly play a greater role. Thus, the efficiency effects of
a nation's corporate governance approach will often be on the margin.
14. The nexus of contracts perspective dates back to Ronald Coase's seminal work, Ronald
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), but it did not become widely influential until the more recent work of Eugene Fama and others. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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entity as an "entity," and more on the wide array of contractual relationships into which the firm enters. While much of corporate law
theory examines the relationship between the managers of the firm
and its shareholders, contracts with other suppliers of capital,
employees, and consumers also play an important role.
In contrast to the earlier literature, which tended to view these
contracts solely in economic terms, recent scholars have begun to pay
close attention to historical, political, cultural, and regulatory influences on corporate contracting. 15 What has emerged is a far more
nuanced explanation of corporate governance, one that has already
paid enormous dividends. Rather surprisingly, however, this literature regularly ignores corporate bankruptcy. In this Part, I argue
that, by adding bankruptcy to the analysis, we can develop a more
complete theoretical account of corporate governance than currently
exists.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. The first step describes
recent developments in our understanding of corporate governance.
The second step adds bankruptcy to the analysis in order to develop a
more complete theory of the evolution of corporate law-a theory that
casts new light on the differences between American corporate governance and the frameworks in place in Germany and Japan.
A. The PoliticalAccount of CorporateGovernance
As economic theorists have explored the nexus of contracts
that comprise a corporation, they have returned again and again to a
single issue: the role of agency costs. 16 Simply put, agency costs are
the costs that arise due to conflicts of interest between a principal and
her agent. If the managers (the agents of shareholders and the
corporation) pursue their own interests-such as leisure or perks, or
their own prestige-rather than the interests of shareholders (the
principal), shareholders suffer the consequences. Much of corporate

15. The most recent work in this vein has asked whether the evolution of corporate law is
"path dependant" and thus potentially inefficient. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 10, at 329;
Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw and Networks of Contracts,81 VA. L. REV. 757,
815-25 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 641 (1996).
16. Jensen and Meckling popularized the term "agency costs" in an article whose importance is difficult to overstate. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Jensen and Meckling defined the total agency costs arising from a principal-agent relationship
as the sum of"(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by
the agent, (3) the residual loss." Id. at 308.
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law and of the parties' own contractual arrangements can be seen as
efforts to minimize these agency costs.
The principal focus throughout the Article will be on the conflicts of interest between the managers and the shareholders of a
corporation-that is, managerial agency costs. However, there are
two additional kinds of perverse incentives that will also come into
play. The first stems from shareholders' incentives. If a firm's capital
structure includes debt, shareholders may encourage the firm's managers to pursue excessively risky strategies, due to the fact that
shareholders will receive all of the benefits of a successful gamble but
will share the costs of a failure with the firm's debtholders. 17
Second, to the extent creditors influence corporate governance,
they too may have perverse incentives. Just as shareholders have an
incentive to encourage too much risk, debtholders prefer that the firm
take too little risk-that is, that it eschew even some risks where the
8
benefits exceed the costs.'

The standard history of corporate law centers on managerial
agency costs. In the early 1930s, Berle and Means inaugurated
modern corporate law scholarship by showing that the rise of the
publicly held corporation in America had produced a deep separation

17. In the corporate finance literature, perverse incentives of this sort are referred to as
an "overinvestment" problem. See generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate
Borrowing,5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (discussing perverse incentives).
Consider a simple example. Suppose that Firm's current assets are worth $100; it owes $80
to Creditor; and Shareholder's stock is worth $20. Firm must decide whether to spend its $100
of assets on a business opportunity with a 10 percent chance of success. If the opportunity is
successful, Firm will be worth $800, but if it fails, Firm's value will drop to $10. A moment's
reflection makes clear that Firm should forgo the opportunity. The opportunity has an expected
value of ($800X.10) + ($10)(.90) = $80.90. Since it would cost $100, Firm should not pursue it.
Shareholder will see the opportunity quite differently however. Although the opportunity
reduces the value of Creditor's interest, it increases the value of Shareholder's interest from $20
to $72. (The expected value of Shareholder's interest if the opportunity succeeds is ($800 $80X.10) = $72, and the expected value in the event of failure is $0 (with the $10 firm value
going to Creditor)). Shareholder therefore will encourage Firm's managers to pursue the
opportunity.
In addition to the overinvestment problem, shareholder decision making may be subject to
an "underinvestment" or "debt overhang" problem if the firm becomes insolvent. The problem is
that shareholders may forgo even positive present-value opportunities if their interest would
remain underwater even in the event of a successful outcome. See id. at 149-54.
18. As in the example given in the previous footnote, assume that Firm owes Creditor $80
and its assets currently are worth $100. This time, however, assume that Firm must decide
whether to spend the $100 to pursue an opportunity with 50 percent probability of success, and
whose values are $200 if successful and $50 if unsuccessful. Because the overall value of the
opportunity is $125, Firm should pursue it. If Creditor were making the decision, however (and
Shareholder could not offer a side payment to Creditor), Creditor would eschew the opportunity,
since it diminishes the value of Firm's obligations to Creditor from $80 to $65. (This is because
there is a 50 percent chance Creditor will be paid the full $80-ifthe prospect is successful-and
a 50 percent chance of receiving only $50; thus, ($80)(.50) + ($50)(.50) = $65.)
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between ownership and control. 19 Although shareholders theoretically
owned the corporations, shareholdings in large corporations were so
widely scattered that shareholders exerted little influence. Because of
shareholders' inability to coordinate-which now would be described
as a "collective action problem"-managers had free rein to run the
°
corporations however they saw fit.2

Subsequent commentators have assumed that the Berle-Means
corporation is economically inevitable. They reason that shareholdings will become increasingly dispersed as corporations grow in size
because shareholders wish to limit their holdings in any given firm in
order to diversify their interests.
Certainly the most intriguing development in recent corporate
law scholarship is the suggestion that the Berle-Means corporation,
with its separation of ownership and control, may owe its existence as
much to politics and history as to economics. Mark Roe and others
have argued that the peculiarities of American regulation of financial
intermediaries played a pivotal role in the emergence and survival of
21
the Berle-Means corporation.
1. Politics, Finance, and the Berle-Means Corporation
The political account begins by considering how American
corporate governance could plausibly have developed away from the
Berle-Means model of powerful managers and passive shareholders.
As capital demands intensified and firms grew in size, financial institutions and other intermediaries could have acquired large blocks of
stock and played an active role in corporate governance. Some institutions did in fact take precisely these steps in the 1920s. DuPont
held twenty-five percent of General Motors' stock, and J.P. Morgan
and Company effectively controlled several railroads and other
22
corporations.

19.

See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 129.

20.

See id.

21.

See, e.g., ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder

PassivityReexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990); John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC, 29
J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American CorporateFinance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, A PoliticalTheory].
22. See Roe, A PoliticalTheory, supra note 21, at 15; see also RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE
OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 224 (1990)

(describing Morgan's role in restructuring General Motors).
Economists have recently begun reconsidering this era, and addressing the effect large
stockholders such as Morgan had on firm value. For evidence that Morgan had a beneficial
effect, see Bradford DeLong, Did J.P.Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on
FinancialCapitalism,in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991).
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Yet the United States did not follow this alternative path.
Legislators repeatedly have taken steps to prevent financial
intermediaries from holding significant equity positions in, and
exerting influence over, industrial corporations.
A variety of
regulatory measures have limited the size of banks and their ability
to hold stock.23

Legislators have similarly discouraged insurance

companies from holding stock,2 and mutual funds from acquiring
significant blocks in individual companies. 25 Pension funds face fewer
restrictions of this sort, but they too have good reason to limit their
influence.26 Far more than economics alone, this mind-numbing web
of regulation has assured the preeminence of the Berle-Means model
of corporate governance in America. 27
Why have legislators worked so hard to limit the influence of
financial intermediaries? Mark Roe has identified three factors as
particularly important. The first is ideological commitments such as
populism. Although commentators often discount the relevance of
ideology to political decision making, Americans have long been suspi-

23. The fragmentation of banks goes back to the National Bank Act of 1863 and the
National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38
(1994)). See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 54. Congress has reinforced the limitations on bank size and power in this century through the McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44
Stat. 1224 (1927), which gave states the authority to limit branching within the state; the GlassSteagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in title 12 of the United
States Code), which separated commercial and investment banking; and the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50),
which limited bank holding companies to activities related to bankruptcy and prohibited them
from holding more than five percent of the voting stock of a non-banking firm. See ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 94-99. In addition, the advent of deposit insurance in 1933
enhanced small banks' ability to compete with larger banks for deposits. See id. at 96.
24. The leading state for insurance law, New York, prohibited insurance companies from
holding common stock after the Armstrong Investigation of 1905 created a scandal within the
industry. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 69-70. New York eased these
restrictions in 1951, but insurers have continued to limit their holdings of stock. See id. at 82.
25. Although mutual funds hold enormous amounts of common stock, they are discouraged from concentrating their holdings and acting as active monitors by the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and the tax laws, which penalize insufficiently diversified funds. See id.
at 103-10.
26. Private pension fund activism is stymied to some extent by the "prudent investor"
doctrine under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA), and still more
by managers' control over the choice of a firm's fund manager. Public pension funds face fewer
restrictions. See id. at 125-26.
27. Several commentators have recently questioned the political account. Tom Smith, for
instance, has argued that the desire of "customers" such as insurance policy holders and mutual
fund investors to minimize risk, rather than politics, explains institutional investors' reluctance
to become actively involved in corporate governance. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and
Entrepreneursin American CorporateFinance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1997). Smith's emphasis
on risk aversion seems more compelling with respect to the customers of some kinds of institutional investors-indexed mutual funds and insurance companies, for instance-than others,
such as non-indexed mutual funds, which are designed to be less cautious.
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cious of big business and large concentrations of capital.28 Financial
institutions have frequently borne the brunt of this distrust. Periodic
investigations into financial institution misbehavior have stoked the
concern that financial institutions be kept in check. Three of the most
prominent were the Armstrong investigation of insurance companies
in 1905, and the Pujo and Pecora investigations of banks in 1911-12
29
and in the early 1930s, each of which fueled legislative reforms.
The other two factors limiting the influence of financial
intermediaries, interest group influence 0 and federalism, have tended
to reinforce one another, particularly in banking regulation. The most
important proponents of banking restrictions were the small banks
scattered throughout the country.31 Small banks lobbied hard for the
geographical restrictions that have long limited banks' ability to
branch across state lines, since fragmentation prevents megabanks
from putting local banks out of business. Small banks were equally
enthusiastic about deposit insurance, which diminishes depositors'
32
incentive to keep their money in large, stable money center banks.
By themselves small banks are only a single interest group, but
federalism's decentralization of power has served to magnify their
influence, since each given state is likely to have a group of locally
important banks. The broad-based influence of local banks-enhanced
by the support of farmers and small businesses-stands in striking
contrast to the geographical concentration of the money center banks
reform, and translates
that have been targeted by financial
33
particularly well in our federal system.

28. See Roe, A PoliticalTheory, supranote 21, at 32-36.
29. See id. at 36-38. In addition to providing a crucial catalyst for change, the investigations put several well-known figures on the political map. Charles Evans Hughes catapulted to
prominence as a result of the Armstrong investigations, and Ferdinand Pecora was an unknown
before taking over the Pecora hearings early in Franklin Roosevelt's administration.
30. Interest group theory is a branch of public choice analysis. For present purposes, its
central insight is that concentrated interest groups tend to have disproportionate influence over
the political process because they, unlike more diffuse groups such as general voters, participate
actively in various ways. I have described interest group analysis and the public choice literatare in much greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the
Futureof Public Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship,50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997) [hereinafter
Skeel, Public Choice].
31. See Roe, A PoliticalTheory, supra note 21, at 45.
32. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 96-97. Interestingly, Morgan and other
prominent banks lent their support to deposit insurance, in large part because they thought this
concession would help them head off the Glass-Steagall proposal to separate commercial and
investment banking. The strategy backfired when both reforms were passed.
33. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 49. The Senate, especially, facilitates
the influence of federalism because every state, no matter how small, has the same number of
senators.
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In sum, populist ideology, the influence of small banks and
farmers, and federalism have worked together to minimize the role of
financial institutions in corporate governance.34 Interestingly, managers appear to have played little role in the fragmentation of financial intermediaries. 5
2. Relational Governance in Japan and Germany
From politics and history, the political account turns to comparative corporate governance to further underscore the contingency
of the Berle-Means model. Exhibits A and B in this part of the account are Japan and Germany, both of whose approaches to corporate
governance look strikingly different from the road taken in American
governance.
In contrast to large U.S. corporations, whose shareholders
have traditionally been dispersed and passive, their German and
Japanese counterparts are characterized by concentrated shareholdings, thin managerial labor markets and relational governance. 36 In
Germany and Japan, banks play a particularly prominent role as
shareholders, and non-financial firms also are much more likely to
hold significant blocks of shares in other corporations than they do in
the United States.
In Germany, large corporations often have three or more bank
shareholders, each of which holds roughly ten percent of the firm's
stock.37 While this alone gives bank shareholders a substantial stake,
they have even more leverage in practice. Not only do the banks serve
as major lenders and underwriters for the firm, but German banks
can also vote the stock they hold in a depository or trust capacity
unless the beneficial owners of the stock affirmatively withdraw this
authority. Banks often exercise their influence formally through
representation on the firm's supervisory board and informally through

38
their ability to step in whenever necessary.

34. This Article will use a similar typology in explaining the emergence of ex post corporate governance in this country and ex ante governance in Japan and Germany in Parts III and
IV, infra, with one important difference. Rather than focusing on federalism alone, the Article

considers the role that structural constraints in general have played in the evolutionary process.
35. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 21, at 45-46. Roe speculates that managers
would, however, actively oppose efforts to retreat from the reforms. See id. at 46.
36. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 169-86; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences
in CorporateStructures in Germany, Japan,and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1936-48
(1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences].
37. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 172.
38. See id. at 172-77.
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The details of Japanese corporate governance differ in important respects, but reflect a similar concentration of shares in the
hands of active shareholders. Prior to World War II, Japanese corporate governance featured a small group of zaibatsu-vast, interconnected, family-run enterprises that included extensive cross holdings
and the presence of a single financing bank. 9 Since World War II and
the dismantling of the zaibatsu by American occupation forces, the
keiretsu have emerged as the principal organizational feature of
Japanese corporate governance.

4
The keiretsu are small groups of closely interconnected firms. 0

Perhaps in part because the United States foisted much of its financial and securities regulation on Japan after World War II, including
our limits on bank stock holdings, keiretsu firms generally have a
small group of significant shareholders, rather than a single, dominant shareholder. 41 These shareholders include one principal bank,
the "main bank," which holds roughly five percent of the stock and
also serves as the primary lender, together with four or five other
large stockholders, each of which holds a similarly large block of
stock. Collectively, these shareholders hold twenty to twenty-five
percent of the firm's stock and a seat at the periodic Presidents'
Council meetings where managers meet informally with the firm's
important shareholders. 42
The effect of concentrated shareholding in Germany and Japan
is to encourage relational governance, rather than the atomized, market-driven governance one sees with U.S. firms.
The large
shareholders tend to hold their shares on a long-term basis and often
43
act as lenders or suppliers to the German or Japanese firms.
39. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1963; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J.
Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization,102 YALE L.J. 871, 882-83 (1993) [hereinafter Gilson & Roe, Overlaps].
Although the zaibatsu are often described as dominating Japanese corporate governance prior to
World War II, Okazaki offers evidence that many large Japanese firms were not part of a
zaibatsu. Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm under the Wartime Planned Economy, in THE
JAPANESE FIM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 350, 351-52 (Masahiko Aoki &
Ronald Dore eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE JAPANESE FIRM] (only 10 of 60 largest mining and
manufacturing firms were zaibatsu-related).
40. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1939.
41. The emergence of powerful institutional shareholders in Japan, despite its adoption of
many of the reforms that produced fragmentation in the United States, is powerful evidence of a
theme that runs throughout the Article-that laws by themselves can be a misleading indicator
of a nation's corporate governance or corporate bankruptcy.
42. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1939-48. Whether the Presidents' Council
meetings play a meaningful role in Japanese governance is debatable, but the large
shareholders themselves clearly do.
43. This is particularly true in Japan. For a description and an argument that cross-holdings help to discourage "stable" shareholders from opportunistically selling their shares, see
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Proponents of the political account point out that these relationships
may facilitate a valuable long-term perspective and the exchange of
confidential information between a firm and its shareholders. The
presence of friendly shareholders appears to chill market correctives
such as hostile takeovers, and the shareholders are well positioned to
intervene and to remove managers or take other steps in the event of
a crisis.

44

In short, German and Japanese corporate governance provide
a vivid counterpoint to the Berle-Means corporation in the United
States. The pattern in both countries of active shareholders with
substantial stakes strongly reinforces the argument that the
American model of fragmented shareholding reflects more than
economic necessity alone.
B. Completing the Governance Puzzle: The Role of
CorporateBankruptcy
The political account has prompted a wide-ranging reconsideration of our assumptions about the Berle-Means corporation. Yet
nearly all of the existing analysis omits a crucial piece from the corporate governance analysis: bankruptcy. This Part introduces that
piece and develops an evolutionary theory of the dynamic between
corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy. The Article will
continue to focus on the United States, Japan, and Germany, but the
theory should apply to corporate governance in any developed nation.
The governance framework of the United States, with relatively dispersed shareholdings and active securities markets, relies in
important part on hostile takeovers to address managerial agency
costs. 45 Poorly run firms may be subject to a takeover and the threat

of takeovers has an important deterrent effect. But hostile takeovers
are a blunt instrument and frequently they misfire. A firm that must

Paul Sheard, Interlocking Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in THE JAPANESE FIRM,

supranote 39, at 310, 325-33.
44. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 169-86; Roe, Some Differences, supra
note 36, at 1936-48. For a criticism of the view that relational shareholding emerged in Japan
at least in part as a conscious effort by managers to chill takeover activity, see J. Mark
Ramseyer, Colombian Cartel Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005, 2009

(1993).
45. A prescient article by Henry Manne anticipated the role that takeovers would play in
subsequent corporate governance. Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). The most prominent recent commentators on the role of
takeovers in addressing managerial agency costs are Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 109-44 (1991).
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shoulder an enormous new debt load, as many takeover targets did in
the 1980s, may face immediate disaster in the event of an unexpected
shock.46 Moreover, firms that are not taken over but whose managers
issue substantial new debt in order to discourage actual or potential
47
bidders face precisely the same risk.

To the extent a firm's failure reflects problems with its capital
structure rather than with the business itself, destruction of its goingconcern value would entail a significant social cost. 48 In view of this,

one might suspect-and one certainly would hope-that a governance
system relying on active markets and the uncertain corrective of
takeovers, would also include a mechanism for keeping existing management in place and preserving going-concern value when an otherwise healthy corporation fails.
In theory, liquidation-oriented bankruptcy could serve this
function. 49 Several bankruptcy commentators have in fact defended
such an approach, arguing that financially distressed businesses
should be sold at auction. 50 However, there are a variety of reasons
why liquidation might prove ineffective as a means of preserving
going-concern value. If a firm's failure comes during a general indus46. One reason for the precariousness of takeovers is that state anti-takeover laws and
takeover defenses make hostile bids much more expensive than they might otherwise be. For a
discussion of these factors and a survey of the empirical evidence on takeover profits, see
Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
119 (1992).
47. Although increasing a firm's debt load increases the risk of bankruptcy, it may also
have desirable effects. As Michael Jensen has pointed out, for instance, debt constrains managers' discretion by reducing free cash flow and can, in consequence, substantially reduce managerial agency costs. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
48. One can perhaps imagine firms designing their capital structure in such a way that
failure is likely to reflect non-viability. For an argument along these lines, see Barry E. Adler,
A Theory of CorporateInsolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343 (1997). However, the text assumes
that capital structure and viability may not be correlated, as is the case under existing
American law. See id. at 344.
49. It might also appear that private renegotiation could preserve going-concern value in
the absence of state-sponsored reorganization. But collective action problems would impede
renegotiation, and in the United States existing legal restrictions would impose further
obstacles. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibitionin Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 232
(1987) (effect of prohibition against binding bondholders by majority vote).
50. Douglas Baird was the first to suggest auctions as an alternative to corporate reorganization. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for CorporateReorganizations,15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986). He later considered the benefits and limitations of such an approach in
thoughtful detail. See Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633
(1993). Several other proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 rely on more elaborate auction
procedures. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics ofBankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 523 (1992) (options-based auction); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations,101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (same). For a review and critique of these and
other proposals, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 465 [hereinafter Skeel, Brave New World].
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try downturn, for instance, the firm's competitors, who often are51 the
most likely bidders, may not be able to participate in the bidding.
More importantly, the prospect of liquidation would influence
managerial behavior in ways that would transform the corporate law
side of U.S. corporate governance. 52 If managers expected to lose their
jobs in the event of bankruptcy, they would face the combined threat
of hostile takeovers, on the one hand, and on the other, displacement
in bankruptcy if the firm failed after the managers took steps such as
issuing new debt in order to protect themselves against the takeover
threat. Rather than simply accept this lose-lose regime, managers
would have an incentive to reduce the firm's debt and to seek out
large, stable shareholders that would implicitly promise not to tender
into any outside tender offer. 53 Alternatively, an increase of the
number of firms that failed following hostile takeovers would lead to
54
pressure by their managers for a more flexible bankruptcy regime.
Either way, if we consider both the background regime and managers'
likely responses to it, it quickly becomes clear that liquidation-based
bankruptcy is unlikely to coexist with active markets and hostile
takeovers.
Although U.S. bankruptcy law includes a liquidation option, it
looks to another mechanism for preserving going-concern value:
In a corporate reorganization under
corporate reorganization.
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,55 a firm's constituencies engage
in an often extended negotiation process, whose goal is to confirm a
reorganization plan that will address the financial difficulties that
landed the firm in bankruptcy.
51. See Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 50, at 477-79 (citing Andrei Shliefer & Robert
W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market EquilibriumApproach, 47 J. FIN.
1343 (1992)). There may also be other reasons for preferring reorganization to an auction, such
as the benefits to competition of preserving the troubled firm as an intact entity.
52. For an analysis of the likely effects of the liquidation-based bankruptcy reforms on
pre-bankruptcy behavior, see Robert K Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform
on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994).
53. If managers persuaded the legislature to eliminate hostile takeovers the ultimate
effect would be similar. Under these circumstances, investors would have an incentive to
acquire concentrated stakes, as discussed in more detail in Part ll.C., infra.
54. Notice that a move to flexible bankruptcy may in fact be in shareholders' (not just
managers') interests in a world with active takeover markets and fragmented ownership. The
benefit of manager-led reorganization is that it helps to coordinate scattered shareholders in the
event of financial distress. For a similar point about managers' role in response to takeover
bids, see, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 502 (1991) (criticizing Easterbrook and Fischel's
proposal to prevent managers from resisting takeover bids as "depriv[ing] shareholders of a
negotiator at precisely the time when they need one most").
55. Provisions of the current Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994), will be cited
hereafter as "Bankruptcy Code § -"
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Notice again the importance of managers' perspectives. If
managers were inevitably displaced in the event of bankruptcy, they
would treat the framework like a liquidation regime, even if it theoretically included a reorganization option, since for them bankruptcy
would be the end of the road. It is therefore crucial to the U.S.
approach that managers retain at least some control over the bankruptcy process.56
To underscore the importance of managers' perspectives, this
Article characterizes each nation's corporate bankruptcy regime as
either "manager-driven" or "manager-displacing." The U.S. approach
typifies manager-driven corporate bankruptcy.
In "manager
displacement" regimes, by contrast, managers lose their jobs if the
firms file for bankruptcy, and bankruptcy generally entails piecemeal
liquidation (even if the bankruptcy laws ostensibly include a reorganization option).57
The characteristics of U.S. corporate governance-active
markets, relatively passive, often scattered shareholders, and a welldeveloped managerial labor market, combined with manager-driven
reorganization in bankruptcy-not only developed together, but also
comprise the complementary facets of a single system. A permanent
change in corporate governance would require a different approach to
corporate bankruptcy, and vice versa. Alternative arrangements
would be inherently unstable.
Throughout the Article, I will refer to the kind of approach we
see in the United States as an ex post governance system. The system
has an ex post perspective in at least two respects. First, on the corporate governance side, hostile takeovers can be seen as an ex post
mechanism for reducing managerial agency costs, since takeover
bidders emerge after managers have failed to run the firm effi56. In particular, Chapter 11 assumes that a firm's managers will continue to run the
firm, Bankruptcy Code §§ 1101, 1107 (assuming continued operation by the "debtor-in-possession"), and it gives the debtor-in-possession the first crack at proposing a reorganization plan,
Bankruptcy Code § 1121 (120-day exclusivity period during which only the debtor-in-possession
may propose plan).
To be sure, managers hardly have free reign in Chapter 11. Recent studies suggest they

frequently are replaced before the conclusion of the reorganization. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson,
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356 (1990) (most current

managers removed before end of Chapter 11 case). But some do retain their jobs, and Chapter
11 is much more attractive to them than the certain displacement of a liquidation regime.
57. As the text suggests, an important reason for focusing on managers, rather than the
distinction between reorganization-based (like the United States) and liquidation-based approaches (like Germany), is that it isolates the single variable that determines how bankruptcy

functions in practice (as opposed to the law "on the books"). For instance, although Japan's
bankruptcy laws include a reorganization option, they also provide for immediate removal of a
firm's managers and invariably lead to liquidation. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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ciently. 58 On the bankruptcy side, Chapter 11 assures that the managers of a firm that encounters financial distress can attempt to
reorganize after the fact.5 9
Given the striking differences between U.S. and Japanese or
German corporate governance, one also would expect Japanese and
German bankruptcy to differ from the American approach. And they
do. In both Japan and Germany, the managers of a firm that files for
bankruptcy lose their jobs immediately. Although Japanese law
purports to provide a bankruptcy reorganization option, there is an
60
extraordinarily strong bias toward liquidation.

Japan and Germany can thus be seen as having adopted an ex
ante approach to corporate governance. In contrast to American
firms, which rely on ex post devices such as takeovers to address
managerial agency costs, Japanese and German corporations look to
existing, long-term shareholders to monitor managerial performance-that is, to "relational" governance.61 On the bankruptcy side,
Japanese and German managers are held to their ex ante contractual
obligations. If a corporation fails, its managers cannot count on a
second chance; quite to the contrary, they face immediate displace62
ment.

58. This does not suggest that hostile takeovers have only an ex post effect. To the contrary, much of their effectiveness stems from their deterrent effect-i.e., the incentive they give
managers to run firms efficiently so that the firm will not be taken over. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 173. I characterize takeovers as ex post because the takeover
mechanism itself operates after the fact.
59. One could also conceptualize the approach in temporal terms. On this view, investors
can intervene to correct poor management at various stages, starting with shareholder voting,
then moving to debtholders' invocation of default rights, hostile takeovers, and as a final resort,
bankruptcy. See George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganizationin
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 101,
105 (1996). As this time line suggests, investors in an ex post regime tend to intervene relatively late, rather than correcting problems early.
60. Japanese corporate bankruptcy law is derived from the Chandler Act amendments to
the former Bankruptcy Act. See infra notes 218, 221 and accompanying text. The Japanese
framework includes an explicit reorganization option but it burdens that option by displacing
the managers of a distressed firm with a trustee. As in Germany, the vast majority of firms are
liquidated if they file for bankruptcy.
German bankruptcy law provides for straight liquidation and a limited composition option,
which permits composition if creditors are likely to recover at least 35 percent of their claims.
Even in a composition, however, the principal goal is to liquidate the firm. Germany has
adopted a more substantial reorganization option to take effect in 1999, but the presumptive
displacement of managers and bias towards liquidation are retained. For further discussion, see
infra Part IV.
61. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate
Governance: Contract,Culture, and the Rule ofLaw, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 3 (1996) (analyzing the
Japanese System).
62. In temporal terms, the relational shareholders tend to intervene earlier, prior to bankruptcy, in an ex ante governance regime. See supranote 59.
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As with ex post governance, the corporate law and bankruptcy
components of ex ante governance are integrally and necessarily connected. Consider first the perspective of a bank that acts as a relational monitor. In order to serve as an effective monitor, the bank
must have enough leverage over the debtor to implement change if
the firm's managers misbehave or the firm performs poorly. Only if it
can displace managers in an emergency, and force a restructuring of
63
the firm, will the bank prove effective as a monitor.
The bank acquires this leverage in several ways. The first is
through simple voting power. The bank is likely to be a significant
shareholder, particularly if it joins forces with other holders of large
blocks of stock.6 Second, in addition to its shareholdings, the bank
often serves as a principal source of financing. If managers resist a
restructuring, the bank can threaten to cut off the firm's financing.
Managers have good reason to respond to this threat because
Japanese and German firms have fewer alternative sources of financing than do their United States counterparts, 65 and because the withdrawal of a relational bank-which knows more about the firm than
any other party-would send a powerfully negative signal to other
potential lenders.
While voting power and control over financing play a significant role in influencing managers' behavior, only by adding bankruptcy to the mix can we appreciate the full extent of the relational
monitor's leverage. Managers face dire consequences (i.e. immediate
removal) if they resist any changes proposed by the relational monitor
and the firm subsequently winds up in bankruptcy. As a result, man-

63.

For a discussion of banks' monitoring role in Japan, see Gilson & Roe, Overlaps, supra

note 39, at 879-82. The Japanese government sometimes figures prominently in corporate
restructurings in Japan, usually to urge the main bank to bail out a troubled firm. For a discussion of some of the perverse incentives this creates for main banks, see Masahiko Aoki, The
Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research Agenda, in THE JAPANESE
FIRM, supranote 39, at 11, 32.
64. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1943-46 (suggesting relational monitors
in Japan and Germany act through coalitions and that no single shareholder has sufficient

power to act as a controlling influence).
65. This is less true now than it was in the past, as secondary markets have expanded in
both countries, but Japanese and German firms are still much more dependant on bank financ-

ing than American firms. Interestingly, as securities markets have expanded in Japan, commercial banks have tried to maintain their dominance by expanding their involvement in
securities underwriting. See Jathon Sapsford, New Rules Roil JapanBond Underwriting,WALL
ST. J., June 11, 1997, at A18 (banks taking advantage of 1993 rule change enabling them to
engage in underwriting).
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ager-displacing bankruptcy powerfully reinforces the credibility of a
66
relational monitor's threat to take action in an ex ante system.
The costs to managers of responding to powerful bank shareholders are justified by important benefits. Although the presence of
large shareholders can be intrusive, the shareholders' long-term
commitment to the firm makes it nearly impossible for an outsider to
acquire sufficient stock to effect a hostile takeover. 67 Moreover, the
cataclysmic effect of failure enhances the attractiveness of relational
monitors whose long-term stake in the firm will encourage them to
stick with the firm in the event of a temporary downturn in fortunes.
From a less benign perspective, managers may also be able to neutralize large shareholders to some extent through implicit side payments
68
such as future business at supracompetitive rates.
Because harsh, manager-displacing bankruptcy cements the
relational governance arrangements in an ex ante system, a shift to
manager-driven bankruptcy would have a serious destabilizing effect.
If managers could file for bankruptcy without fear of immediately
losing their jobs and with a real possibility of reorganizing, the relational bank's threat of displacement would lose much of its bite. An
unforgiving bankruptcy regime is thus crucial-not just useful-to ex
ante governance.
To complete the picture, one more player must be added to our
account of ex ante governance: the state. In Japan in particular, the
government plays an active role in corporate governance. In addition
to an ongoing process referred to as Administrative Guidance, the
state sometimes pressures relational monitors to preserve a troubled

66. In the corporate finance field, Robert Hauswald makes a somewhat similar point, and
develops a theory of the relationship between banking and bankruptcy laws that parallels my
analysis in some respects. See Robert B.H. Hauswald, Banking Systems, Bankruptcy
Arrangements and Institutional Complementarity (March 27, 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) [hereinafter Banking Systems]; Robert B.H. Hauswald, Financial
Contracting, Reorganization and Mixed Finance: A Theory of Banking Systems (March 7, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Financial Contracting]. In contrast
to my approach in this Article, he focuses narrowly on the role of limited and universal banking.
This, together with his focus on legal rules rather than how governance functions in practice,
leads to substantial differences in the analyses. Thus, Hauswald reaches the unlikely
conclusion that Japanese governance parallels American rather than German governance. See
also F.H. Buckley, The CanadianKeiretsu, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 46, 52 (1997) (absence of
stay of enforcement rights crucial to banks' influence in Canada).
67. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 171 ("managers [in Japan and Germany]
prefer institutional white squires, who shield managers from outside pressures, to takeovers");
Sheard, supranote 43, at 319 (role of interlocking shareholdings in chilling takeovers).
68. For a similar concern about concentrated shareholding in Canadian firms, see Ronald
J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Toward a Distinctive CanadianCorporateLaw Regime, 29
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 863, 884-88 (1991).
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firm that the monitor would otherwise force into liquidation.69 In both
Japan and Germany, the state is also much more likely than in the
United States to rescue (either directly or indirectly) a failing firm.70

Although state intervention is a form of forced reorganization,
managers will still behave very much as they would under an unforgiving bankruptcy regime. Managers cannot assume that the state
will intervene, and they almost certainly will be removed even if it
does. Moreover, the absence of a well-developed managerial labor
market ensures that managers will gravitate toward the kinds of
relational governance that minimize the likelihood of failure in the
first instance.
One final point of clarification: while banks are the most obvious relational monitors, it is important to emphasize that other firms
also may play this role in an ex ante system. In Japan, for instance,
roughly one-third of the existing keiretsu are comprised of cross-holdings among firms and their suppliers and customers.7 1 Non-bank
financial institutions, such as insurance companies, pension funds or
other large-scale shareholders, may also act as relational monitors.
Relational governance should therefore be seen as comprehensive
monitoring by any one or any combination of these firms.
C. Complements and Substitutes in CorporateGovernance: Some
Concluding Thoughts
Although this Article has argued that active markets tend to
correlate with manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy (an
ex post framework) and that we can expect to see manager-displacing
bankruptcy in regimes characterized by relational governance (an ex
ante framework), this does not mean that every nation's governance
regime will fit as neatly into one category or the other as the United
States, Japan, and Germany do. On the contrary, my evolutionary
theory predicts a dynamic relationship between the approaches to
corporate governance in any given country. A shift in corporate gov-

69. See Aoki, supra note 63, at 32; Milhaupt, supra note 61, at 36-39.
70. The United States government does occasionally intervene when a firm is in financial
distress, as it did with Chrysler during the 1980s, and has done so more frequently with banks,
such as Continental Illinois, that are similarly "too big to fail." But these examples are exceptions to the rule. For a detailed case study illustrating the often indirect nature of governmental influence in Japan, see Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround,9 J.
JAPAN STUD. 219, 230-33 (1983).
71. See Gilson & Roe, Overlaps, supra note 39, at 882; see also Aoki, supra note 63, at 21
(40 percent of shares of non-financial firms held by financial firms, 30 percent held by other nonfinancial corporations).
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ernance due to legal changes, politics, or the parties' responses to
these factors will only take hold if there is an analogous shift on the
bankruptcy side.
To develop these insights further, it is useful to draw on several concepts that have figured prominently in the recent corporate
literature. Milgrom, Roberts, and their co-authors have characterized
governance devices that seem to function in tandem as "substitutes"
and "complements."72 Complementary devices vary together, such
73
that increases in one almost always entail increases in the others.
In more technical terms, complements are subject to increasing
returns to scale because adding a complementary mechanism enhances the effectiveness of those aspects of the system that are already in place7 4 As a result, complements tend to reinforce one another while alternative arrangements prove unstable.
Substitutes, by contrast, are replacements for one another.
The appearance of one tends to reflect a shift away from the other.
Thus, in a firm's decision whether to engage independent contractors
or employees to sell a product, salaries and commissions are
substitute incentive devices. If a firm shifts to salary, it also is likely
to increase its use of salary complements such as job rotation and
75
limits on outside activity.
With corporate governance, then, market-driven corporate
governance complements flexible, manager-driven bankruptcy in an
ex post system, and relational governance complements managerdisplacing bankruptcy in ex ante regimes. Similarly, each of the complements in the ex post system is a substitute for the corresponding
device in an ex ante system. Thus, relational governance (with thin
labor markets) is a substitute for active takeover and managerial

72. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 Am.
ECON. REV. 972 (1994); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern
Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization,80 AM. ECON. REV. 511 (1990). For a

useful, relatively non-technical introduction to this literature, see JAMEs A. BRICEY ET AL.,
MANAGERIAL EcoNoMIcs AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHiTECTURE 71-74 (1997).

73. See, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 72, at 514. Milgrom and Roberts argue that
the covariance of complementary institutions is a function of increasing returns, which they
define as "supermodularity."
74. See id.
75. See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supranote 72, at 989.
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labor markets, 76 and manager-displacing bankruptcy substitutes for a
manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy process. 7
Consider in slightly more detail what would happen if one part
of the governance regime were altered. As discussed earlier,78 in a
regime that mixed ex post governance with manager-displacing (ex
ante) bankruptcy, managers would have an incentive to seek out
relational investors both to neutralize the threat of a hostile takeover,
and to reduce the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing in the event of
9
financial distress.7
To complete the analysis, consider the perspective of investors.
In a regime with scattered shareholdings, liquid markets, and manager-displacing bankruptcy, substantial gains are available to an investor who acquires a concentrated stake. Such an investor is particularly well positioned to monitor the firm, since managers' concerns
about hostile takeovers and the threat of displacement in the event of
bankruptcy will afford significant leverage over managerial decision
making. Gains that stem from enhanced monitoring would often be
socially beneficial, but there is a less benign side as well. A concentrated investor may also enjoy special treatment from managers who
are eager to buy the investor's peace-managers may direct business
to the investor, for instance, or offer other private benefits.8o
Whatever the mix of benefits, the overall effect would be to move
corporate governance in an ex ante direction.
76. An interesting illustration of the substitutionary relationship can be found in commentators' characterization of relational governance-in particular, relational shareholders' ability
to effect change-as "internalizing" the takeover market. See, e.g., Sheard, supra note 43, at
318-20.
77. Because voting authority is important to both ex ante and ex post governance, proxy
contests play an intriguing intermediate role in the two systems. The threat of a proxy contest
is an important component of ex ante governance, as this reinforces the relational monitors'
leverage over the debtor. But the availability of the device tends to make its use unnecessary.
In an ex post system, by contrast, proxy contests are an important adjunct to the takeover
process. In the 1950s, most American takeovers were effected through proxy contests, and
proxy contests have become more prevalent in recent years due to the obstacles to direct
takeovers.
78. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
79. As also discussed earlier, an alternative possibility is that the managers of distressed
firms might try to retain control in bankruptcy and to effect a reorganization-that is, to shift
the regime back in an ex post direction. If this proved successful over time, the nation's corporate law would also tend to retain an ex post character. For an argument that something like
this occurred in American corporate law and bankruptcy in the 1950s, see infra Part II.E. The
point, once again, is that the relationship between corporate law and bankruptcy is dynamic,
and that the two will evolve in tandem.
80. Ed Rock has characterized this as a "dark side" of the recent enthusiasm for relational
governance in the United States. Edward B. Rock, Controllingthe Dark Side of Relational
Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994); see also Daniels & MacIntosh, supra note 68, at 896
(describing Canadian corporate governance).
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The analysis thus far has shown that the combination of ex
post corporate law and ex ante bankruptcy would prove unstable. The
opposite combination-ex ante corporate law and ex post bankruptcy-is implausible for very similar reasons. Without managerdisplacing bankruptcy, relational governance would lose much of its
effectiveness. Unless creditors took control of the bankruptcy process
(thus shifting it in an ex ante, manager-displacing direction), stock
ownership would fragment; we would then expect to see market
correctives such as takeovers or, in their absence, proxy contests
replace relational monitoring as the principal mechanism for
disciplining managers. 81
The evolutionary theory developed in this Article does not
depend on any particular claims about the direction as causality. It
seems likely that changes in corporate governance will more
frequently prompt changes in bankruptcy, rather than the reverse,
given that the percentage of publicly held firms that fail at any
particular time is relatively low. But the important point is that a
shift in one attribute will inevitably lead to a shift in the other, as
managers and investors adjust to the change.
The theoretical analysis raises a host of questions. First, why
has the United States gravitated toward ex post governance, whereas
Japanese and German corporate law is characterized by ex ante
governance? Second, is one approach more efficient than the other?
Third, how stable is the approach in any given country? That is, will
the patterns that we see under existing law endure, or can we expect
to see significant changes, such as a convergence on ex ante
governance, ex post governance, or some middle ground?
The next two Parts address the first question, how it is that
corporate governance evolves within a given nation, with particular
emphasis on the evolution of ex post governance in the United States.
These Parts show both the institutional nature of the evolutionary
process and the extent to which changes in corporate governance have
paralleled changes in corporate bankruptcy. Having considered the
issue of "why" there is ex post governance in this country, and ex ante

81. American corporate governance in recent years seems at first glance to be an exception to this analysis. In the 1980s, managers successfully lobbied the legislatures of many
states for anti-takeover protection, thus shifting American corporate governance in an ex ante
direction. This does not mean that American corporate law is now ex ante in nature, however.
Anti-takeover statutes and other developments have burdened the market for corporate control,
but takeovers have not disappeared. Bidders have increased their use of other pressures, such
as proxy contests, to effect change. Though not as market-driven as it might be, American
corporate law, like American bankruptcy, has remained decidedly ex post in character.
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governance in Japan and Germany, we can then compare the
efficiency and stability of the two systems in Part V.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW AND
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Part II contended that corporate bankruptcy is the crucial
Having
missing piece in understanding corporate governance.
explored this argument in general terms, we shift now to a more
nuanced, historical perspective, beginning in this Part with the
emergence of ex post governance in the United States. The analysis
will once again place particular emphasis on bankruptcy, both
because of its importance to the overall story and because much of
this story has not previously been told. But it is important to keep in
mind that the overall focus is on both corporate governance and
corporate bankruptcy. To make this explicit, I will regularly relate
the analysis to historical developments on the corporate law side.
82
The account that follows is one of adaptive evolution.
Although the focus of this part is descriptive rather than normative,
the analysis will be colored by my view that competitive pressures
impel the evolutionary process in developed nations in a generally
efficient direction.83 Although political and historical events can
influence development, sometimes in dramatic ways, the resulting
system is unlikely to prove markedly inefficient over time.84
Periodic price shocks have served as the principal catalyst for
change, prompting nearly all of the historical developments in our

82.

The most prominent exponent of this institutional approach to economic history is

Douglass North.

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1991); see also Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive
Mechanisms in Different Economic Systems, in INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ARNE RYDE SYMPOSIUM, FROSTAVALLEN 26-27 (Stefan Hedlund ed.,
1985) (developing theory of adaptive evolution of institutions).
83. This will be particularly apparent when the Article compares the efficiency of ex ante
and expost governance in Part V.B.
84. Because manager-driven corporate reorganization emerged in the United States in the
common law, the analysis that follows has important implications for the debate as to the
efficiency of the common law. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection ofEfficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For a discussion of the debate spawned by these articles,
see Skeel, Public Choice,supra note 30, at 662-63.
Interest group distortions-especially the influence of lawyers-call into question any strong
claims about the efficiency of the common law. Yet market competition acts as a powerful
counteractive to any egregious inefficiencies in the bankruptcy framework. See infra Part
V.A1.
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corporate bankruptcy framework."5 To appreciate how the existing
framework emerged and the uniquely American flavor of the process,
it is useful to focus on three different factors: (1) interest group
influence; (2) structural constraints; and (3) ideology. I use these factors to explain five critical phases in the development of managerdriven corporate reorganization. The story begins with the emergence
of equity receiverships to reorganize railroads in the nineteenth
century. It continues with the uncertainty in the 1920s as to whether
the managers of non-railroad corporations could use the receivership
device to reorganize. Next are the sweeping changes ushered in by
the New Deal, and the decline of the role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in corporate bankruptcy beginning in the
1950s. This Part concludes with a brief discussion of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code and subsequent trends.
At each stage of the analysis, I also note the prevailing
characteristics of corporate governance. The correlation between
changes in corporate governance and in corporate bankruptcy is not
immediate, but the historical analysis strongly confirms the link
between the two.
A. The Storyline: Three CentralFactors
The methodology of public choice figures permanently in the
analysis. Public choice analysis assumes that legislators and other
institutional players, such as judges, tend to act in their own selfinterest; and that largely because of this, interest groups play a
particularly influential role in legislative and judicial developments,
just as they do in the marketplace.8 Yet interest group analysis by
itself can only begin to explain how the current framework arose.8 7 To
provide a more complete account I also consider the crucial role that
structural constraints and ideology have played in directing the
evolution of American corporate bankruptcy.
85. North argues that dramatic shifts can occur in the wake of significant price changes
because price changes give the relevant parties an incentive to renegotiate the rules of interaction. Yet the tenacity of existing norms may prevent change even if the formal rules change.
See NORTH, supra note 82, at 86-91. In the analysis that follows in this Part and the next, we
will see evidence of both elements--dramatic change and the tenacity of underlying norms.
86. For a detailed discussion of the public choice literature and its two principal strands of
interest group theory and social choice, see Skeel, Public Choice, supra note 30. In the political
sphere, interest group influence stems from the fact that interest groups tend to participate
much more actively in the legislative process-contributing to campaigns and voting, for instance-than does the diffuse general group of voters. See id. at 651-52.
87. See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 22-32 (emphasizing role of populism and
other factors in legislation affecting corporate governance).
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1. Interest Groups
From an interest group perspective, players are in many
respects the same as in the political account of corporate law, though
with several important differences. The analysis will pay particular
attention to the role of managers (both their presence and, at times,
their surprising absence), Wall Street banks, and New Deal
reformers. Much more than in corporate law, lawyers ss also left their
mark in important ways.
2. Structural Constraints
Most of the principal structural constraints we will see on
corporate law can be traced to the federalism enshrined in the United
States Constitution. In contrast to most other nations, the United
States is divided into numerous individual states that traditionally
have wielded substantial political power. States' influence comes both
from explicit constitutional directives and the power they derive from
the federalist system as a whole.8 9 In addition to federalism, the respective roles of Congress and the courts figure prominently in the
evolutionary story.
3. Ideology
The final factor is ideology, which the Article will construe
broadly to mean any widely held view about the appropriate treatment of publicly held corporations. Perhaps the most enduring ideological commitment in this country is an aversion to the concentration
of capital in large banks and corporations. In corporate law, this
aversion helps to explain the fragmentation of banks and the much
smaller role they play in the United States, as compared to Japan and
Germany.90 It also influences debates about bankruptcy-sometimes
in counterintuitive ways. Although manager-driven reorganization
seems to cater to big business and may therefore provoke a skeptical
88. The focus throughout the early part of the story will be on the elite Wall Street reorganization bar, which developed and perfected the equity receivership procedure. Although the
general bankruptcy bar-lawyers involved in the bankruptcy cases of individuals and small
businesses--does not figure in the initial development of corporate reorganization, its influence
does have an important-albeit partially accidental-effect on the Chandler Act of 1938 and
subsequent developments. See infra Part uI.E.
89. As noted earlier, I refer to structural constraints rather than simply federalism
because other, often related factors-such as the nature and capacity of the judicial
system-also come into play. See supranote 34.
90. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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response, for instance, it also diminishes the influence that banks and
other large stakeholders might have in a harsher, manager-displacement regime.
Two other ideological themes also recur: first, the American
fascination with second chances and reversals of fortune; 91 and second, the view that certain firms cannot be permitted to fail, even if
92
Congress itself cannot realistically take action.
One must, of course, be cautious about attaching causal significance to ideology, since it almost by definition reflects the nature
of prevailing institutional conditions. Yet ideological currents do shift
in ways that are useful to understanding the emergence of the
American corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy framework.
Using these tools, let us consider the remarkable story of how
ex post governance emerged in the United States.
B. Equity Receiverships and RailroadReorganization
If the early history of flexible, reorganization-based corporate
bankruptcy could be distilled to a single word, that word would be
"railroads."93 As difficult as it is to imagine today, the existence of
manager-driven reorganization was not at all inevitable. Well into
the nineteenth century, financial distress meant displacement of the
firm's managers and piecemeal liquidation, much as it does in Japan
94
and Germany today.
To understand why this changed, and the peculiar institutional pressures that produced our current bankruptcy system, we
must briefly consider the explosive growth and rocky history of railroads in the nineteenth century. In both the 1870s and the 1890s, the
railroads were crippled by financial crises brought on by overexpansion and a shaky national economy. 95 One after another the
railroads failed, raising the question: what should be done?
91. This theme pervades much of the popular mythology about America and its history,
from the Horatio Alger stories to Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis." See, e.g.,
FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).

92. Recent beneficiaries of this are Chrysler, which the government helped to keep out of
bankruptcy, and in banking, Continental Illinois.
93. This in a sense is no surprise, since the railroads were the nation's first true publicly
held corporations. The changes in technology that produced the railroads and later, the other
great trusts, initiated the era of large-scale business in America. The classic account of the
influence of technology on the emergence of publicly held corporations is ALFRED D. CHANDLER,
JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
94. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, RehabilitatingValues: A Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy,
91 COLuM. L. REV. 717, 745-46 (1991).
95. See Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional
Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 688 (1974).
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The role of ideology in answering this question was simple and
quite clear. Almost everyone agreed that the railroads could not be
permitted to fail. Unlike most other corporations, railroads served a
crucial public function that was essential to the nation's growth.
Interestingly, vestiges of this sentiment can still be found in the
Bankruptcy Code's special railroad provisions, which forbid liquidation and require judges to take the "public interest" into account. 96
The governments of most other countries, Japan and Germany
included, might well have responded by intervening directly or
indirectly to rescue the railroads. In this country, by contrast,
Congress never intervened. The parties were left to their own devices
due to structural constraints that loomed particularly large in the
nineteenth century.
The Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to establish
the nation's bankruptcy laws97 If there had been a bankruptcy law on

the books at the end of the 1870s or in the early 1890s, the law itself
could have provided for railroad reorganization, as the current Code
does. 98 The absence of a bankruptcy law was the result of
impassioned debate on both whether there was a need for federal
bankruptcy and how extensive Congress's bankruptcy powers actually
were.9 9 Powerful advocates of states' rights, ranging from Thomas
Jefferson early in the century to John Calhoun later on, argued for
very limited powers. Most importantly for present purposes, the
debates raised serious doubts as to whether Congress could regulate
the bankruptcy of corporations, given that the states regulated all
other aspects of a corporation's existence. 00
Congress could have intervened in other ways but similar
constraints rendered this unlikely. Although railroads are a classic
example of interstate commerce, Congress's Commerce Clause powers
were construed extremely narrowly for much of the nineteenth century. Even if it could have intervened in multi-state railroads,
96. Bankruptcy Code § 1165; see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 219
(1997).
97. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 4 states that "Congress shall have the Power... [t]o
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
98. See generally Martin, supra note 95, at 688 (emphasizing the absence of any federal
bankruptcy law between 1878 and 1896, and railroad bondholders' foreclosure rights as important factors in the emergence of equity receivership).
99. For a discussion of the nineteenth century debates as to the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause and its applicability to corporations, see Skeel, Rethinking,supra note 5, at 476-89.
100. See id. at 480-82. Thus, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky argued forcefully that
"'Corporations are artificial beings, created by the States.... [The States] know when it is best
to make or abolish them.'" Id. at 481 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess., at 848
(1840)).
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Congress's authority over single state railroads was questionable. 10 1
More importantly in practical terms, the states were sufficiently
10 2
powerful-particularly in the Senate-to tie Congress's hands.
Congress's inability to act did not mean that state legislatures
could fill the void. Because many railroads operated in more than one
state, and states had very little ability to influence out-of-state activi03
ties, state legislatures proved similarly impotent.
This then was the dilemma: a deep ideological consensus sug-

gested that railroads should not be permitted to fail, but structural
constraints stymied the most obvious solution. The fact that structural constraints precluded a legislative solution is particularly note-

worthy given that so many of the principal interest groups-not just
the managers of railroads, but shareholders, creditors, investment
bankers, and railroad lawyers-were squarely in favor of reorganizing
rather than liquidating the railroads. 1 4
A key factor in the parties' convergence of interests was the
chaotic capital structure of the railroads. Railroads frequently financed expansion by selling secured bonds to the public (often to

foreign rather than American investors).0 5 Rather than granting
blanket security interests, as a firm might do today, the railroads
offered discrete sections of track or other assets as collateral.
101. As late as the New Deal bankruptcy reforms of the 1930s, some lawmakers continued
to raise questions as to whether Congress could invoke its commerce powers to regulate single
state railroads. As a result, the railroad reorganization provision, section 77, as initially enacted was limited to railroads that engaged in interstate commerce.
102. Until 1913, senators were elected by state legislatures, which gave states enormous
influence in the Senate. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public
Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994).
103. States' inability to affect out-of-state interests was one of the arguments for federalizing corporate bankruptcy in the nineteenth century. See Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 5, at
547 & n.327; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 368 (1827) ("discharge under
a state law [is] incompetent to discharge a debt due a citizen of another state").
104. Some interest groups might prefer that a particular railroad be allowed to
fail-healthy, competing railroads, for instance, or firms engaged in competing modes of transportation such as shipping (and in this century, trucking). It is possible that these interests
lobbied against legislative intervention, though I have seen no evidence of this in my research.
The possibility that such groups might have reinforced the resistance to federal legislation
points to an important advantage of a judicial solution such as the one that emerged--only the
parties directly interested in the fate of a particular railroad would have standing to support or
oppose the receivership process. Receivership is therefore an example of a context where the
choice of institutions (in this case, the courts rather than Congress) significantly affects the
interest group dynamic. For a discussion of institutional choice, see generally NEIL K.
KOMEsAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND

PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
105. By the early part of this century, European investors held roughly one-third of the
bonded debt of American railroads. See F.H. Buckley, The American Stay, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 733, 743 (1994) (citing WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 8
(1927)).
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Consequently, one issuance might be secured by a segment of track in
one part of the state, another by track in a different part. What resulted was a crazy quilt of security interests, made even more
Byzantine by waves of mergers among the railroads. 06
The problems from the bondholders' perspective were that it
would be nearly impossible to unravel the respective priorities of the
bond issues, and that the value of their collateral-say, one hundred
miles of track in the middle of nowhere-was essentially worthless
unless the railroad remained intact. As a result, bondholders who
under other circumstances might have fiercely resisted managers'
efforts to reorganize 07 had every bit as much to gain from keeping the
railroad intact as its managers and shareholders did.
With strong ideological and interest group support for preserving railroads and with legislative or executive solutions largely foreclosed, railroad managers, through their lawyers and investment
bankers, turned to the only obvious alternative: the judicial system.108
In effect, managers and their advisers took creditors' state law debt
collection remedies and turned them inside out to fit the needs of
troubled railroads. In a pattern that reorganization lawyers perfected
through time, the railroad would arrange for a friendly creditor
(generally an out-of-state creditor, to create federal diversity
jurisdiction) to file a creditor's bill asking for the appointment of a
receiver. 10 9 Rather than preparing to liquidate assets, as a creditor's

106. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 95, at 699 (the "fact is that only a financial wizard... could have sorted out the property represented by the mortgages of the numerous
railroads which comprised the Wabash").
107. Secured creditors and mortgage holders generally are viewed as having little to gain

through a manager-driven bankruptcy reorganization process. At best, they are made no worse
off than in liquidation, and in reality their interests are impaired in a variety of ways. For a
discussion, see Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy, Sharing,and the Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 187-89 (1989).
108. Perhaps more accurately, the railroads' lawyers and bankers used the judicial system

to effectuate what in many respects was a negotiated workout-i.e., private ordering. For an
argument that the early railroad receivership practice reflected a gradual shift from paternalis-

tic efforts by bankers to act as trustees for scattered bondholders to private ordering through
contract, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 101-08

(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
109. Paul D. Cravath, one of the leading lights in the reorganization bar, described the

standard procedure in detail in a much-cited article.

Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of

Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153 (1917) [hereinafter 1 SOME
LEGAL PHASES]. The Cravath firm played a central role in the railroad receiverships from the
beginning, and was one of several Wall Street firms whose elite status was closely tied to their
reorganization practice. The firm's history, written by Cravath's successor as the firm's (and
arguably the nation's) most prominent reorganization lawyer, gives much of the flavor of the
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bill contemplated, the receivers, who generally included members of
the railroad's management, worked out the terms of a
reorganization. 110 At the same time, the railroad's investment
bankers formed bondholder "protective committees" and attempted to
persuade the bondholders to deposit their securities with the
committee, which would commit the bondholders to the terms of the
eventual reorganization. Once everything was in place, the bonds and
other security interests were foreclosed and the railroad's assets were
"sold" in a foreclosure sale. In reality, the "sale" simply effected a
reorganization of the railroad's capital structure."' The judges who
oversaw this manipulation of liquidation procedures knew exactly
what was going on 12 but the pressure to reorganize the railroads was
3
so strong that they routinely approved the reorganizations."
This is not to say that railroad receiverships proved to be one
big happy party for everyone. The parties negotiated aggressively
early successes. ROBERT T. SwAINE, 2 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819-1948,
at 167-75 (1948) (describing "Frisco" reorganization).
110. Because even federal courts did not have jurisdiction over out-of-state property, it was
necessary to set up ancillary receiverships in each of the districts where the railroad had property. See, e.g., James Byrne, The ForeclosureofRailroadMortgages in the United States Court,
in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES, supra note 109, at 77, 78-79.

111. For another recent article describing the equity receivership process in the context of a
defense of current Chapter 11, see Douglas G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An
Overview of the Law and Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). One commentator has argued that, if existing creditors had
been precluded from bidding at the foreclosure sale, third-party bidders might have made bids,
and a liquidation-based regime might have emerged. See Jeffrey Stern, Note, Failed Markets
and Failed Solutions: The Unwitting Formulationof the CorporateReorganization Technique,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 800-01 (1990).

It is important to keep in mind that the equity receivership process took place entirely
outside of the federal bankruptcy laws. It was not until the 1930s that Congress added an
effective manager-driven reorganization provision to the Bankruptcy Act.
112. Commentators roundly criticized the collusive nature of jurisdiction and the artificiality of the ostensible foreclosure "sale" early on. See, e.g., D.H. Chamberlain, New Fashioned
Receiverships, 10 HARV. L. REV. 139, 141 (1896). For a later, rather colorful critique of the
practice, see Jerome Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate
Reorganizations, 19 VA. L. REV. 541 (1933); William H. Taft, Recent Criticism of the Federal
Judiciary,18 A.BA REP. 237, 260-64 (1895).
113. In the most notorious of all the railroad receiverships, the Wabash-notorious because
the railroad's managers dispensed with the pretense of creditor action and simply requested the
receivership themselves-Judge Treat alluded to this pressure in justifying his decision to honor
the railroad's request:
[Unless a creditor acts] the court must either stop running the road, or an expenditure
be made for the benefit of all parties in interest.., in order that it shall be made a going
concern. Otherwise, in the expressive language of a distinguished friend, you have
nothing but a streak of iron-rust on the prairie.
Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, 29 Fed. 618, 626 (E.D. Mo. 1886). For a vigorous criticism of the
Wabash case, see Chamberlain, supra note 112, at 143-46. For an argument that the judges in
the equity receivership cases had an ideological interest in promoting the development of
railroads, see GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL ORDER, 1865-1917, at 55-60 (1994).
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over their respective stakes in the reorganization. General creditors
increasingly complained that the railroad's managers, shareholders,
and bondholders were colluding to squeeze them out. The Supreme
Court agreed in several cases that eventually produced bankruptcy's
absolute priority rule. 114 At the same time, however, the Court
consistently upheld the equity receivership device for reorganizing
5

railroads.1

The late nineteenth century also was a time of great transition
in corporate law generally. After carefully doling out charters in the
early nineteenth century, states began to grant them much more liberally by the middle decades. 1 6 The late nineteenth century saw the
emergence of the great trusts and a much more market-based (and
quite controversial) corporate law as technology supported large-scale
enterprise. 1 7 It was the rapid expansion of railroads and other
business ventures, and managers' efforts to address the financial
distress that sometimes ensued, which continued to create pressure
for manager-driven corporate reorganization.
C. The 1920s: Cracks in the Reorganization Wall
The same Wall Street bankers and lawyers who perfected the
railroad receivership form in the 1870s continued to dominate the
receivership practice in the early twentieth century as advisors to
debtors and the bondholder protective committees set up to effect a
reorganization. The reorganizers also continued to wrestle with many
of the issues that had arisen earlier-most prominently, how dissenting creditors were to be treated and how strictly priorities were to
be construed-but by 1908, the validity of the process as a whole was
clear. 118
114. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (holding that unsecured
creditor cannot be squeezed out); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany, & Chicago Ry.
Co., 174 U.S. 674 (1899) (same). The absolute priority rule prohibits lower priority creditors and
shareholders from retaining any interest unless higher priority creditors are paid in full.
115. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 228 U.S. at 509-10; In re Metropolitan Ry.
Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 112 (1908); Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 689.
116. See Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 483; see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth.
Century JurisdictionalCompetition in the Grantingof CorporatePrivileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
129 (1985).
117. For an argument that the Supreme Court's rejection of Sherman Act challenges to the
sugar trust reflected a belief that states should regulate merger activity, and that the states'
failure to do this facilitated the trusts' expansion, see Chaxles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar
Decision of 1895 and the Modernizationof American CorporateLaw, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST.
REV. 304 (1979).
118. In 1908, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the jurisdictional basis for railroad receivership. See In re MetropolitanRy. Receivership, 208 U.S. at 112.
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At first glance the routinization of receiverships might suggest
that manager-driven bankruptcy, and perhaps even an overall system
of ex post corporate governance, was in place in the United States as
of the early 1900s. This would be getting ahead of the story, however,
in several respects. First, even with railroads, governance patterns
deviated from the ex post paradigm of active markets and managerdriven bankruptcy. A true ex post system requires not just a reorganization option in bankruptcy, but also that managers have some
control over the process. 119 Although managers had initially called the
shots in important respects, at least in the days of larger-than-life
owners like Jay Gould, creditors often controlled the receivership
process in the early 1900s.120 From managers' perspective, the conditions were closer to a manager-displacement regime than might initially seem the case.
Just as railroad receivership contained hints of an ex ante
regime, so too did railroad governance. Although railroad securities
were often widely held, the same creditors that controlled the bankruptcy process-including J.P. Morgan and Company and other
banks-also figured prominently outside of receivership. In addition
to their role as bankers, they often held substantial amounts of
securities and served on the board, much as Japanese and German
banks do today. 121
Why did managers relinquish so much control to creditors
during this time? The most obvious explanation is that a small group
of investment banking firms controlled large scale financing. 122 One

119. See supra Part II.B.
120. Investment bankers exerted particular influence in the receivership process-often
displacing existing management-from the late nineteenth century on. See Buckley, supra note
105, at 743; see also E.G. CAMPBELL, THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RAILROAD
SYSTEM, 1893-1900, at 145-82 (1938). J.P. Morgan and Company played an important role in
several of the reorganizations. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 67-69.

Receivership practice in this era paralleled in many respects the current landscape of
Canadian corporate law. Canadian law, like American practice in the 1920s, includes a reorganization option, but creditors exert much more influence over the process than in the current,

manager-driven American regime. For an extensive comparison, see Lynn M. LoPucki &
George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and CanadianReorganization of
FinanciallyDistressedCompanies, 35 HARV. INTL L.J. 267 (1994).

121. Early efforts to neutralize the role of large financial intermediaries in corporate
governance had already begun to take effect. In addition to New York's legislation prohibiting
insurers from holding stock in the wake of the 1905 Armstrong investigation, the 1911-1912
Pujo hearings (together with a desire to curry favor with President Wilson) prompted J.P.
Morgan's partners to unilaterally resign from all of the corporate boards on which they had
previously sat. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 180. Yet Morgan and other banks continued to

retain enormous influence until the sweeping reforms of the New Deal.
122. For a good summary of the debate as to whether the bankers' influence was benign or
malignant, see DeLong, supranote 22, at 205.
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possibility, then, is that managers had little choice but to cede control
to J.P. Morgan or one of its counterparts if they wished to issue securities publicly. It is also quite possible that managers could diminish
the risk of displacement through implicit side payments to the investment bank, as they do in Japan and Germany today.
The second reason the ex post system was not fully in place in
the early 1900s, at least on the bankruptcy side, is that the developments we have considered all involved railroads. Equity receiverships
could easily be adapted to non-railroad corporations, and they made
sense as a response to these firms' financial distress. Yet the impulse
toward manager-driven reorganization was weaker in several respects. Most importantly, the perception that railroads were public in
nature and could not be allowed to fail simply did not apply to many
non-railroad corporations. As with ideological concerns, the interest
group dynamic also played out somewhat differently. Whereas railroads were vastly more valuable as going concerns than in liquidation, this was not so self-evidently true with other corporations.
Thus, there was much less of an obvious consensus in favor of manager-driven reorganization.
Starting in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began hinting that
railroads were a special case, and that the Court had serious doubts
about other firms' use of the receivership process. In Harkin v.
Brundage, the Court suggested that it would not simply rubberstamp,
in non-railroad cases, the collusive techniques that managers and
their professionals used in railroad receiverships to establish
jurisdiction. 123 The Court was still more explicit in Shapiro v. Wilgus,
where it indicated that these techniques passed muster in railroad
cases only because railroads were "public service corporation[s]"
whose "service[s were] in furtherance of the public good." 12 The Court
went on to say that "[wle have given warning more than once.., that
the remedy [when only private interests are at stake] is not to be
granted loosely, but is to be watched with jealous eyes."125

123. 276 U.S. 36, 52(1928).
124. 287 U.S. 348,356 (1932).
125. Id. The Court returned to this theme yet again in FirstNat'l Bank v. Flershem, 290
U.S. 504 (1934), where Justice Brandeis noted that "[aill of the cases in which this Court
appears to have [upheld the use of an equity receivership] in aid of reorganization upon the
ground of insolvency dealt with railroads or other public utilities where continued operation of
the property... seemed to be required in the public interest." Id. at 515 n.7.
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As of the late 1920s, then, the status of manager-driven receivership for non-railroad corporations was uncertain. 126 Far from embodying a clear ex post character, American corporate governance,
with the continuing influence of the much criticized "Money Trust"
banks, had in many respects shifted in an ex ante direction.
D. Remaking American Bankruptcy Law in a New Deal Image
In the standard account of American bankruptcy law, ex post
bankruptcy began with the bankruptcy reforms of the New Deal. As
bankruptcy scholars are quick to note, these reforms eliminated the
problems that had bedeviled the jerry-rigged receivership process and
established a reorganization-based bankruptcy system once and for
all. As we have seen, in the political account of American corporate
governance, the New Deal financial reforms played a central role in
fragmenting financial intermediaries and reifying the patterns we see
in publicly held corporations. 127 To the extent that flexible, reorganization-based bankruptcy took permanent form in the 1930s, these
developments strongly confirm the complementary relationship between market-driven corporate governance and manager-driven
bankruptcy, exemplifying one part of the system developing in
tandem with the other.
As convenient as this account is, it is nevertheless misleading
in important respects. Rather than a single set of reforms, for instance, the New Deal bankruptcy reforms proceeded in two distinct
steps, the first culminating in 1933 and 1934 and the second in 1938.
Moreover, while these reforms did eliminate some of the obstacles to
reorganization under the equity receiverships, the 1938 reforms
added manager-displacingprovisions that largely reversed the effect
of codifying manager-driven reorganization.
The analysis that follows views the New Deal bankruptcy reforms through the lens of the three factors we have been considering.
On the legislative side, bankruptcy lawyers and New Deal reformers
are the principal interest groups. The most significant surprise is the
relative silence of corporate managers. Although managers actively
responded to shifts in the background regime, they added their voices
to the legislative debates much less than one might have predicted.

126. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate ReorganizationsAct, 48
HARV.L. REV. 39, 42-45 (1934) (discussing the "waxing doubt [due to the Supreme Court pro-

nouncements] as to the validity of the procedural device").
127. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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1. Codifying Corporate Reorganization: Sections 77 and 77B
All of the New Deal bankruptcy reforms can be traced to the
Thacher Report, which, together with the earlier Donovan Report,
presented the findings of a widespread investigation commenced in
1929.128 The investigation found evidence of substantial administrative corruption. To remedy this, the Thacher Report recommended
sweeping changes to the powers and compensation of bankruptcy
referees and trustees, and the creation of a bankruptcy
administrator.129 The Thacher Report also proposed that a new,
manager-driven, corporate reorganization provision be added to the
130
Bankruptcy Act.
Lawmakers immediately converted the Thacher Report recommendations into proposed legislation, and the House and Senate
judiciary committees held extensive joint hearings on the legislation
in early 1932.131 In contrast to subsequent congressional activity, the
joint hearings focused almost exclusively on personal bankruptcy and
administrative structure. 132 Although it was clear that the proposals
were too controversial for serious consideration in 1932, an election
year, a more limited bill covering personal bankruptcy, corporate
reorganization, and railroad reorganization was quickly introduced in
the House in January 1933.

128. STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: THE REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BANKRUPTCY LAw AND PRACTICE, S. Doc. No. 72-65 (1932) [hereinafter
THACHER REPORT]. The Donovan Report, 71ST CONG., REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
BANKRUPTCY ESTATES (Comm. Print 1931) [hereinafter DONOVAN REPORT], focused on administrative abuses in the bankruptcy system. The investigation continued when Judge Thacher, a
principal contributor to the Donovan Report, became Solicitor General under President Hoover.
Using the Donovan Report findings as a backdrop, the ThacherReport proposed wide-ranging
changes to the Bankruptcy Act.
129. See THACHER REPORT, supra note 128, at 104-07 (administrators), 110-23 (trustees),
123-25 (referees).
130. See id. at 90. Interestingly, the ThacherReport was commissioned during the Hoover
administration while many of the reforms it proposed were adopted under Roosevelt. William
Douglas' involvement spanned both eras, first through his work investigating personal
bankruptcy and later on the protective committee project he spearheaded with the SEC.
131. See Joint Hearings on S. 3866 Before the Subcomms. on the Judiciary,72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932) [hereinafter 1932 Hearings].
132. The principal interest groups who testified in the hearings were: the Attorney General's office, represented by Lloyd Garrison, who proposed and defended the bill; general bankruptcy lawyers (individually and through organizations such as the American Bar Association),
who vehemently opposed the bill as making unnecessary changes to a generally effective
system; organizations of various trade creditors, who enthusiastically supported the
bill-particularly its provision to appoint an executive branch administrator to monitor cases;
and bankruptcy referees, whose views were somewhat mixed on issues other than strengthening
their authority. It appears to have been the lawyers' unified opposition that doomed the bill.
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By this time pressure to take action had mounted. With no
further hearings and relatively little debate, the House approved the
entire bill and passed it on to the Senate. 133 After initially dropping
the corporate and railroad reorganization sections from the bill,134
Senator Daniel Hastings reintroduced Section 77, the railroad reorganization section. In February 1933, the Senate passed the proposed
bill, including the railroad section, despite concerns that it was acting
too quickly and that it should go further and give the Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC") complete control over distressed
railroads. 3 5 With the President's signature in March, the legislation
became law.136

In addition to bringing railroads within the Bankruptcy Act for
the first time, Section 77 made several other important changes. It
provided that dissenters would be bound by a two-thirds vote of their
class; 137 it also gave the ICC authority to propose trustees, to set limits on compensation, and most significantly, to pass judgment on any
proposed reorganization plan. 18
With railroad reorganization taken care of, Congress turned its
attention to corporate reorganization. After cursory hearings before
the House Judiciary Committee, 139 Congress debated the proposed
corporate reorganization section in early 1934.140 Like Section 77,
133. See 76 CONG. REC. H2931-32 (1933).
134. See 76 CONG. REC. S4876 (1933). In addition to Section 77, the railroad reorganization
provision, the bill also included new sections governing compositions-i.e., negotiated
compromises of debt terms with creditors-for individuals (Section 74) and farmers (Section 75).
135. The railroad amendment passed by a vote of 42-15 (excluding paired votes), see 76
CONG. REc. S5134 (1933), and the bill as a whole then passed by a vote of 44-8 (excluding pairs),
see 76 CONG. REC. S5136 (1933). Thereafter, the House agreed to the bill, as amended in
several respects by the Senate, by a vote of 207-26. See 76 CONG. REC. H5360 (1933).
Several senators complained that the railroad provision had not been given sufficient study,
and that only Senator Hastings understood its terms. See, e.g., 76 CONG. REC. S4884 (Feb. 24,
1933) (Senator Bratton, another member of the three senator subcommittee considering the
railroad provision, noting that only Hastings focused on the provision); see also Max Lowenthal,
The Railroad Reorganization Act, 47 HARV. L. REV. 18, 22 (1933) (complaining that the
provision was passed too quickly and included insufficient safeguards).
136. See Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204 § 77, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933) (codified prior to repeal at
11 U.S.C. § 204 (1934)).
137. The most important effect of the voting requirement was to eliminate the obligation to
pay dissenting creditors in cash.
138. Section 77(e) (binding effect of two-thirds vote); 77(c) (appointment of trustees); 77(f)
(expenses).
139. The House Judiciary Committee considered the corporate reorganization provision
briefly at the end of lengthy hearings on municipal bankruptcy. See Hearingon H.R. 1670, etc,
5009, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter Section
77B Hearing].
140. Much of the Senate debate was unrelated to the corporate reorganization provision
itself, focusing on farm relief proposed by Senator Frazier and including a lengthy filibuster by
Senator Huey Long when it was clear the farm amendment would fail. See 77 CONG. REC.
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Section 77B provided for the binding of dissenters through a classwide
vote. The new section differed, however, in one dramatic respect: it
did not provide for governmental oversight parallel to the role of the
141
ICC in railroad reorganization.
This was how manager-driven corporate and railroad reorganization became part of the Bankruptcy Act and equity receiverships
came to an end. Notice that these reforms occurred at precisely the
same time as Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
As is often the case, the backdrop of each of these changes was
a dramatic price shock-here, the onset of the Depression and the
wave of failures it produced. 4 2 The Depression had an obvious effect

on the structural constraints that had forced the managers of troubled
railroads in a judicial direction in the nineteenth century. Whatever
the constitutional limitations, there was a widespread view that
Congress must take action. 43 Thus, structural constraints and ideological considerations both strongly influenced the legislative turn
that bankruptcy reform took in the early 1930s.
While this much is old hat, the plot thickens when we consider
the role of interest groups in the enactment of Sections 77 and 77B.
The single most active interest group was the reorganization bar,
which vigorously supported codification of corporate reorganization.'"
In at least one respect the bar's support is puzzling. Wall Street
lawyers had an enormous interest in the existing equity receivership
practice. This interest would seem to give them ample reason to
resist codification, since legislative action might undermine the value
of their expertise with existing procedures or diminish the flexibility
of the procedures. Why then were Wall Street lawyers so enthusiastic
about codifying corporate reorganization?

S8082 (1934) (farm amendment rejected); id. (bill passes Senate). The House, which had passed
the provision the previous year, once again passed the bill with very little debate. See 77 CONG.
REc. H5015 (1934).
141. The most obvious reason for the difference between the railroad and corporate sections
is that the ICC already had oversight authority over railroads, whereas no existing agency had
previously (i.e., prior to the creation of the SEC in 1933) exercised authority over corporations.
142. See NORTH, supra note 82, at 83-92 (noting the importance of price changes).
143.

See, e.g., ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE CRIsis OF THE OLD ORDER 166-76 (1955)

(describing desperate conditions of 1932 and pressure for federal action).
144. Most prominently, Robert Swaine urged federal legislation in several speeches and
articles. See, e.g., Robert T. Swaine, Corporate Reorganization-An Amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium, 19 VA. L. REV. 317 (1933) [hereinafter Swaine, Corporate
Reorganization]; Robert T. Swaine, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization: An
Affirmative View, 19 A.B.A. J. 698 (1933) (reprinting speech) [hereinafter Swaine, Federal
Legislation].
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One reason was that however lucrative ancillary receiverships
were for professionals in the states where satellite receivers were
needed, the Wall Street lawyers who quarterbacked the process saw
them as a costly nuisance. 145
Second, the existing receivership
strategy required the managers of troubled firms and their lawyers to
pay dissenting creditors in cash, which became increasingly difficult
as the Depression dried up sources of capital. 146 The reorganization
bar saw federal legislation as a way to eliminate both of these
practical problems and at the same time remove the cloud of legal
uncertainty hanging over the use of receiverships to reorganize non47
railroad firms.
Closely allied with the reorganization bar-although less visible-were the Wall Street underwriters who played a central role in
organizing protective committees, serving as receivers, and acting as
underwriters for any securities issuance required for the reorganiza48
tion.
The biggest surprise, given their prominent place in equity
receivership history, is that managers stayed well in the background
in the legislative debates that produced Sections 77 and 77B. Debtors
and potential debtors had an obvious interest in supporting legislation that made reorganization easier, and they lobbied directly from
time to time. 149 But these appearances were much more the exception
than the rule.150
One possible explanation for managers' silence is that they
could protect themselves more effectively in other ways, and thus had
little need to promote manager-driven reorganization. If managers

145. See, e.g., Swaine, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 144, at 320-21 (noting

inconvenience of ancillary receiverships and courts' use of process to dispense patronage);
Friendly, supranote 126, at 46.
146. See Swaine, CorporateReorganization,supra note 144, at 326 (noting burden of paying
cash to dissenters); Friendly, supra note 126, at 48 (same).
147. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.

148. Investment bankers did not testify in the hearings that produced Sections 77 and 77B.
It was only in the subsequent reforms, particularly the abortive Lea Bill, that investment
bankers played an active and visible role. An obvious explanation for this is that, unlike
Sections 77 and 77B, the subsequent reforms directly attacked investment bankers' roles in
corporate reorganizations.
149. See Section 77B Hearing,supra note 139, at 207 (Representative Shannon of Missouri

reads telegram urging reform as beneficial to the reorganization of Long Bell Lumber Co.).
More often, the influence of managers can be seen indirectly. Senator Hastings, for instance,
noted on several occasions that railroad executives supported the passage of Section 77. See,
e.g., 76 CONG. REc. S5107 (1933) (emphasizing that the ICC and railroad executives approve of

the reforms).
150. Eric Posner found a similar dearth of lobbying by debtors and their managers in his
extensive analysis of the political economy of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Eric Posner, The
PoliticalEconomy ofthe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 54-55 (1997).
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included generous severance provisions in their compensation, for
instance, their employment contracts might counteract any concerns
about bankruptcy, much as golden parachutes reduce target directors'
aversion to takeovers. Yet severance rights have a crucial limitation.
Severance payments would simply be treated as an unsecured claim
in bankruptcy and thus would offer only limited protection. 151
The more likely explanation stems from managers' bounded
foresight. Most managers do not anticipate that their firm will fail, so
they see little reason to lobby prior to failure. Further, although the
managers of current debtors care deeply about the parameters of
bankruptcy law, they generally will not benefit from subsequent
reform. 152 From this perspective, the fact that potential debtors
played at least a background role can be seen as a tribute to the depth
and severity of the Great Depression.
Another surprise in the legislative history of Sections 77 and
77B is that the New Deal reformers offered precious little resistance
to these reforms, despite the fact that the most obvious beneficiaries
were managers and Wall Street professionals. 153 Although they were
enacted at precisely the same time as Glass-Steagall and the
Securities Acts, the reorganization provisions protected most aspects

151. Managers could ensure a much greater recovery by taking a security interest to collateralize the severance payments, but I have not seen evidence that managers have ever done
this. Bankruptcy attorneys sometimes insist on security to assure priority in bankruptcy. See,
e.g., In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (law firm with mortgage on debtor property).
152. In view of this, it is not surprising that the debtors who did lobby were principally concerned about transition effects. Thus, some debtors hoped legislation would affect their existing
reorganization effort, see, e.g., Section 77B Hearing,supra note 139, at 207 (telegram supporting
reform as beneficial to the reorganization of Long Bell Lumber Co.); others hoped to avoid
coming changes, see, e.g., 77 CoNG. REc. S13,769 (1935) (Senator Barkley successfully introducing amendment during 1935 debates making clear that new mandatory trustee requirement
included in the 1935 revisions to Section 77 would not apply to existing reorganizations).
The concern with transition effects was equally pronounced in the later hearings that led to
the Chandler Act in 1938. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,House of
Representatives, on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong. 164 (1937) (statement of William 0. Douglas, SEC
Chairman) (arguing that the reforms should be applied to pending cases) [hereinafter 1937
House Hearings];id. at 290 (statement of Alfred N. Heuston, Bar Association of New York City)
(arguing against application to current cases).
153. This would change dramatically later in the 1930s, but at this point there were only a
few lone voices excoriating corporate managers, Wall Street underwriters and the reorganization bar. One reformer who was quite vocal, even early on, was Max Lowenthal. Lowenthal's
book, The Investor Pays, which focused on the St. Paul railroad receivership, sharply criticized
underwriters and the reorganization bar. MAXLOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933). He was
similarly critical in several law review articles. See, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 135, at 22
(criticizing the railroad reorganization provision).
For an explanation of one prominent reformer's silence, see Letter from William 0. Douglas
to E. Merrick Dodd, William Douglas Papers, Container No. 5, Library of Congress (Jan. 29,
1934) (commenting on Dodd's concerns about Section 77B and suggesting that "any opposition
would be more effective if it envisaged a rather definite alternative").
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of existing practice. Principally due to efforts of the ICC, Section 77
did attempt to curb bankers' fees by subjecting them to ICC
oversight,15 4 and it gave the ICC a central role in the proceedings. But
Section 77B, the general corporate reorganization provision, did not
provide for any additional governmental oversight. 155 Moreover, both
sections gave the reorganization bar and their clients, debtors'
managers, much of what they wanted: reorganization would bind
dissenters, and existing management would often remain in control.
The stunning success of the reorganization bar can be attributed to several important distinctions between corporate bankruptcy
and the other governance reforms taking place at the same time.
Probably the most important distinction was ideological. Whereas
ideology sounded a consistent theme in the latter context-that it was
time to rein in the Wall Street bankers-its influence on bankruptcy
reform was somewhat more nuanced. Concerns about big business
and the excessive control of bankers abounded, but they competed
with a widespread perception that something must be done quickly to
rescue large numbers of railroads and other corporations that were on
the verge of collapse.156
A second distinguishing factor was the very different interest
group dynamic. In the banking and securities reforms, Wall Street
banks were aligned against both the reformers and a powerful interest group-small town banks-that would benefit enormously if the
Wall Street banks were crippled. Because no similarly powerful

154. Section 77 gave the ICC authority to set maximum amounts for fees, but both reformers and the reorganization bar suspected that the parties could circumvent the strictures
through contractual provisions that provided for fees explicitly. See Lowenthal, supra note 135,
at 52-56 (reformer concerned that the oversight would prove ineffective); Churchill Rodgers &
Littleton Groom, Reorganizationof Railroad CorporationsUnder Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 33 CoLUM. L. REV. 571, 587 (1933) (attorneys confident the strictures could be avoided).
155. For a note of alarm on this score, see Joseph L. Weiner, CorporateReorganization:
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 34 CoLUm. L. REv. 1173, 1195 (1934) ("[L]ooking at Section
77B as New Deal legislation, it leaves much to be desired.... [Ilt may fairly be said that the
operation of equity receiverships... was not made the subject of any extensive inquiry."). See
also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 35 HARV.
L. REv. 1100, 1135 (1935) (Section 77B, "taken as a whole, seems more nearly to embody the
views of reorganizers than any other group").
156. Thus, one or two legislators complained that Section 77 would simply help out corporate debtors, rather than helping small investors, see, e.g., 76 CONG. REc. H2918 (Jan. 23, 1933)
(remarks of Rep. Dies); yet both legislators and commentators voiced the view that bankruptcy
relief for corporations was one of only two ways of dealing with the Depression (inflating the
currency being the other), see 77 CONG. REc. S7902 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Shipstead); George
G. Battle, The Enactment of the New Bankruptcy Law Will Check the Tendency Toward
CurrencyInflation, 19 VA. L. REV. 340, 340-42 (1933).
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interest group played an analogous role in bankruptcy reform, the
reformers did not have an obvious ally in their efforts. 157
If the new railroad and corporate reorganization sections
marked the end of New Deal reform, we would have a particularly
tidy account of how Congress locked in ex post governance by fragmenting banks and codifying manager-driven corporate reorganization at the same time. Rather than stopping with Sections 77 and
77B, however, Congress adopted far more sweeping reforms in the
years that followed.
2. New Deal Reform in Full Bloom: The Chandler Act of 1938
It was perhaps inevitable that Congress would soon overhaul
its work from the 1930s. The new manager-driven reorganization
framework had been adopted in great haste and many members of
Congress viewed it from the beginning as a stop-gap measure. 158
Congress first revisited the regulation of railroad reorganization in Section 77. After relatively extensive hearings in early 1935,159
Congress quickly passed amendatory legislation. 160 The most important amendments, all of which had been urged by the ICC, made the
appointment of trustees mandatory; provided a cramdown procedure
to facilitate reorganizations favored by the ICC even if one or more
classes voted the plan down; and reinforced the ICC's control over the
payment of expenses. 161

157. The effect of these differences is particularly striking if we consider that Section 77,
with its overlay of ICC oversight, was enacted at the end of President Hoover's term, whereas
Section 77B, which gave the reorganizers even more of what they wanted, bore President
Roosevelt's signature.
158. Thus, by the time the SEC neared completion of the protective committee study
Congress had commissioned in 1934, much more dramatic changes were in store.
159. See Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,House of Representatives, on H.R.
6249, 74th Cong. (1935) [hereinafter 1935 RailroadHearings].
160. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 74-381, 49 Stat. 911 (1935)
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1935)).
161. The initial impetus for revisiting Section 77 was the ICC's concern that railroads were
simply languishing in bankruptcy.
See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF
TRANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 74-89 (1935) (recommending changes).
Few corporations
reorganized, due apparently to shareholders' belief they would fare better if they waited out the
Depression. The principal controversy in the hearings concerned the ICC's proposal that
valuation be based on present and projected future earnings only-replacement values were
explicitly excluded. Railroad shareholders (including controlling interests such as the Van
Sweringens, who became notorious for the extensive railroad empire they built in the 1930s)
feared that their interests would be wiped out under this standard. The bill as passed adopted a
modified and slightly compromised version of the ICC provision.
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Though dramatic in some respects, the amendments to Section
77 could fairly be described as tinkering. 162 Section 77 continued to
assume that managers would remain in place (together with a
nonmanagement trustee), and thus remained largely manager-driven.
Congress's amendments to Section 77B would go much further, and
with the Chandler Act of 1938, would wrench the corporate
reorganization provisions in a manager-displacing, ex ante direction.
The deliberations that eventually led to the Chandler Act began when a group of academics and practitioners formed the National
Bankruptcy Conference in order to address the many issues they
believed were neglected by the 1933 and 1934 reforms. 163 Until the
late 1930s, when the SEC entered the picture, the National
Bankruptcy Conference's relatively technical proposals were the
principal basis for discussion about additional amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. 164
What spurred the SEC into action was a report Congress had
commissioned from the SEC when it enacted the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.165 As William Douglas, who was given control of the
report, investigated corporate reorganization prior to and under
Section 77B, he became increasingly convinced that the practice was
shot through with abuse. The report's most frequent targets were
underwriters and the reorganization bar, who were depicted as more
concerned with fees and keeping managers happy than with the investors they ostensibly represented.166

162. For a useful overview generally praising the changes though questioning the constitutionality of the cramdown provision, see Henry J. Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad
ReorganizationAct, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 27 (1935).
163. Among the organizations that spearheaded the National Bankruptcy Conference were
the American Bar Association, the Commercial Law League, the National Credit Men's
Association, and the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy. See Reuben G. Hunt, The
Progressof the ChandlerBankruptcy Bill, 42 CoMM. L.J. 195, 195 (1937).
164. See, e.g., 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152 (statement of Rep. Chandler)
(describing National Bankruptcy Conference efforts and subsequent proposal by SEC to
completely overhaul Section 77B).
165. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 4, 211, 48 Stat. 881, 885,
909 (1934).
166. The report eventually filled eight volumes, 1-8 SEcURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTMTIES, PERSONNEL
AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937-40) [hereinafter SEC

Critics challenged its breathless, "dime novel" tone, Robert T. Swaine,
REPORT].
"Democratization"of CorporateReorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 256, 259 (1938), and even
Douglas himself noted that the report was as much a brief supporting the SEC proposals as an
objective report, see 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152, at 199 (statement of William 0.
Douglas, SEC Chairman) (describing the reports as "in the nature of briefs in favor of the
Chandler Bill"); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The SEC's Reform Program for Bankruptcy
Reorganization, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225 (1938) (advocate of the reforms noting that the
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Drawing almost verbatim from the proposals of the SEC report, with at most the grudging acquiescence of the National
Bankruptcy Conference, 167 the Chandler Act adopted two kinds of
curatives in Chapter X, the chapter designed to address the reorganization of publicly held firms. The first curative was to end the perceived hegemony of a debtor's managers and underwriters over corporate reorganization. Chapter X achieved this by essentially removing
these insiders from the process altogether. Thus in every sizable case,
Chapter X required that the debtor's current managers be replaced by
a trustee. 168 Not only were underwriters and the firm's lawyers prohibited from becoming the trustee, but their ability to manage the
reorganization process and to shape its outcome was also eliminated.
Chapter X permitted only the disinterested trustee, not the underwriters or any other party, to propose a reorganization plan, 69 and it
gutted the old protective committee process by prohibiting anyone
from soliciting acceptances of a reorganization plan until the plan had
been proposed by the trustee and approved by the court.170

reports are "essentially briefs" and "we should be on our guard against the easy assumption that
the picture [the reports provide]... is one which is in no need of retouching").
167. The National Bankruptcy Conference voted at a meeting in March 1937 to approve the
SEC's corporate reorganization proposals, but as recounted by John Gerdes, the vote was
extremely close and few National Bankruptcy Conference members were present at the time.
See 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152, at 363-65 (remarks of John Gerdes). Several
members of the conference actively criticized the reforms in the hearings, particularly the
mandatory appointment of a trustee. See, e.g., id. at 284 (statement of Alfred N. Heuston)
(criticizing trustee provision and likelihood that SEC involvement would slow cases down).
For its part, the SEC also compromised on several issues with the National Bankruptcy
Conference in order to assure passage. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET 196 (1982) (SEC accepted provision that would allow relatively small creditors to initiate a bankruptcy case).
168. See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 156, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (1938) (codified prior to
repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 156 (1938)). The Chandler Act permitted a court to appoint an existing
manager as trustee, but required in such circumstances that a second, non-insider also be
appointed.
The mandatory trustee requirement was by far the most hotly contested provision in the
Chandler Act. It drew vigorous criticism both in the hearings and in the dissenting report of a
minority of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT ON H.R. 8046, S. REP. No. 75-1916 (1938).
169. See Chandler Act § 169, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 569
(1938)). For a discussion criticizing (delicately) the diminished role for private parties in
negotiating a plan, see James N. Rosenberg, Reorganization: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,
25 VA. L. REv. 129, 144, 146 (1938).
170. See Chandler Act § 169, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 569
(1938)).
The Lea Bill, which would have amended the Securities Act of 1933 to give the SEC wide
ranging powers to regulate protective committee activity in bankruptcy, would have imposed
even more draconian restrictions. For a description of the Lea Bill Proposals, see John Gerdes,
Section 77B, The Chandler Bill and other Proposed Revisions, 35 MICH. L. REV. 361, 368-73
(1937). See Cloyd LaPorte, Note, Changes in CorporateReorganization ProcedureProposed by
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In addition to shutting insiders out of the process, the
Chandler Act also gave broad-ranging authority to the SEC to ensure
that investors' interests were adequately represented. To facilitate
SEC advocacy, Chapter X gave the Commission standing to act as a
party in interest at any point. Chapter X also required that any reorganization plan in a case over $3 million be submitted to the SEC for
71
comments prior to confirmation. '
The effect of the reforms was to completely transform Section
77B and the equity receivership process that had inspired it. In place
of manager-driven bankruptcy, the reformers interposed a harsher,
manager-displacement regime. The reformers' vision did not entirely
replace other perspectives. The Chandler Act preserved the reorganizers' original goal of providing a mechanism for binding dissenters.
Furthermore, in what may have been in part a concession to the
National Bankruptcy Conference, it limited the SEC to an advisory
role, 17 2 rather than giving it the kind of regulatory oversight the ICC
had wielded in railroad reorganizations.173 But there was little
74
question as to whose vision Chapter X of the Chandler Act reflected.
In form, the Chandler Act preserved the ex post negotiation
process that had developed in the equity receivership era and had
been codified in Section 77B. But the Chandler Act dramatically
changed the tenor of the process from manager-driven bankruptcy to
a manager-displacement approach. Stated differently, the Chandler
Act superficially resembled a flexible bankruptcy regime, since it
contemplated reorganization of troubled firms.
However, its
manager-displacement presumptions gave managers an enormous
the Chandlerand Lea Bills, 51 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1938). After extensive hearings in June and
July, 1937, the bill died, leaving the Chandler Act as the single source of regulation.
171. See Chandler Act § 172, 52 Stat. at 890 (codified prior to repeal at 11 U.S.C. § 582
(1938)).
172. See 1937 House Hearings, supra note 152, at 146 (statement of Jacob Weinstein)
(suggesting the SEC agreed to be limited to an advisory role).
173. Of particular importance for subsequent developments, the SEC largely limited its
focus to Chapter X's provisions for large corporations. In consequence, the National Bankruptcy
Conference and the bankruptcy attorneys it represented got nearly everything they wanted in
the other provisions of the Chandler Act, including those dealing with smaller corporations.
This fact will figure prominently in the discussion of the developments of the 1950s. See infra
Part III.E.
174. One of the most far reaching implications of the Chandler Act is that it altered the
interest group dynamic in American corporate bankruptcy in ways that have apparently never
been fully recognized. By effectively cutting Wall Street bankers out of corporate reorganization, the Chandler Act not only eliminated one previously important interest group, the bankers
themselves, but it also ended the Wall Street reorganization bar's influence over corporate
reorganization. Because the Wall Street firms' status was closely linked to that of their clients,
the Wall Street banks, removing the banks opened up and eventually transformed bankruptcy
practice.
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incentive to avoid bankruptcy at all costs-precisely the incentive
175
they have in an ex ante regime.
E. Reinforcing Ex Post Governance in the 1950s
Rather than a single, coherent governance framework, the
New Deal left a striking tension in American corporate law. On the
corporate governance side, New Deal financial reform laid the
groundwork for ex post governance by limiting institutional investors'
ability to hold and exercise large equity stakes in industrial corporations. By contrast, the Chandler Act introduced a harsh, managerdisplacing regime to bankruptcy.
The evolutionary theory of this Article suggests that such a
regime-mixing ex post corporate governance with ex ante bankruptcy-is unstable. The theory predicts that subsequent developments would either push corporate governance in an ex ante direction,
or managers would somehow reestablish a manager-driven bankruptcy process. This is just what happened, as the second of these
possibilities gradually won out.
Although the economy emerged from the Depression in the
1940s, it was the expanding peacetime economy of the 1950s that once
again turned attention to the corporate governance issues Congress
had legislated on during the 1930s. Stock market trading increased
to levels that had not been seen since the 1920s, and buyers suddenly
began to use the voting power their shares gave them to wage
contests for corporate control-a trend traced by some to Robert
Young's stunning victory in the battle for control of the New York
Central Railroad in 1954.176 While the emergence of an active market
for control is classic evidence of ex post governance, there was widespread resistance to the increase in hostile takeovers. 7 7 There also
175. In fact, it appears that the Chandler Act chilled filings and frequently caused liquidation, particularly as compared to the current reorganization framework. This seems likely to be
at least part of the explanation for Bradley and Rosenzweig's data suggesting that shareholder
value declines more significantly under current law than under the Chandler Act regime. See
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043
(1992) [hereinafter Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case]; Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, In Defense of Abolishing Chapter 11 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
176. See CHERNOW, supra note 22, at 508-11 (describing the proxy contest and characterizing it as an assault on previous norms of Wall Street behavior). Proxy contests were the hostile
takeover device of choice in the 1950s. It was not until the 1960's that raiders began using
tender offers, which proved more effective in practice.
177. See Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management
Responsible, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 46-48 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960)

(noting and criticizing fact that "Jr]aiding is regarded as something more than uncouth... it is
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remained the possibility that banks or other intermediaries might
178
evade the restrictions on their involvement in corporate governance
and that managers might welcome large, stable shareholders as an
antidote to takeovers, as they have in Japan and Germany.
By the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, these issues were
resolved in favor of market-driven governance rather than concentrated shareholding. Legislatively, Congress preempted banks' use of
holding companies to circumvent the New Deal reforms by enacting
the Holding Company Act of 1956.179 Ideological factors such as the
strong disfavor that would have met increasing involvement by banks
and insurance companies in corporate affairs may also have
discouraged these institutions from getting more involved. 180 Further,
market trading remained strong, control contests continued, and
firms increasingly used performance-based compensation to sharpen
managers' focus on the performance of the firm's stock.181

Given the redoubled emphasis on an ex post approach to corporate governance in the 1950s, one might predict that managers would
have found ways to evade the more draconian provisions of the
Chandler Act-that is, that the upsurge in market-driven corporate
governance would be accompanied by a shift in its bankruptcy law
complement toward a more flexible, manager-driven regime. 8 2 This
in fact is precisely what took place, through a remarkable sequence of
events that ended the SEC's role as a major player in corporate
reorganization.1m

treated as almost illegal"); see also Bayless Manning, Jr., The American Stockholder, 67 YALE
L.J. 1477, 1494 n.32 (1958) (bemoaning increase of takeovers).
178. The chief threat came from the bank holding company structure, which banks had
begun using as a means of circumventing branching restrictions.
179. Roe discusses the Holding Company Act and its significance in freezing banks out of
American corporate governance in ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 98-100.
180. See, e.g., id. at 87 (noting insurance company fear of additional regulation).
181. Randy Krozner has tracked the striking increase in corporations' use of stock and
stock options, in the 1950s and thereafter, to align managers' interests with that of shareholders. See Randall Krozner, Were the Good Old Days that Good? (1997) (unpublished draft, on file
with author). One reason for this may have been accounting changes in the 1950s that made it
cheaper for firms to give their executives stock options. But the evolutionary theory of this
Article suggests another reason: as the New Deal reforms eliminated banks' ability to serve as
relational monitors, incentive compensation may have emerged, along with more active
markets, as an alternative mechanism for reducing managerial agency costs.
182. Another possibility is that managers would seek legislative protection from takeovers.
This in fact is exactly what they did with the 1968 Williams Act and subsequent state antitakeover statutes. But these dampened rather than eliminated the takeover market.
183. For further discussion of the events that follow and a public choice-based theory as to
why the SEC disappeared, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy
(1998) (unpublished draft, on file with author).
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To appreciate how the SEC was outmaneuvered, one must first
return to the structure of the Chandler Act itself. In addition to
Chapter X, which was the focus of the SEC's attention, the Chandler
Act also included a second reorganization chapter, Chapter XI. 1' In
contrast to Chapter X's trustee requirement and pervasive government oversight, Chapter XI left a firm's managers in control and did
not provide for SEC intervention. 85 It was clear to everyone that
Chapter X was designed for publicly held corporations and that
Chapter XI was designed for small firms. Yet nothing in the
Chandler Act precluded the managers of a large corporation from
steering the firm toward the more hospitable waters of Chapter XI
rather than filing under Chapter X,186 a defect that the SEC and
commentators noticed and decried almost immediately. 187
In the early years of the Chandler Act, the SEC appeared to
have headed off managers' efforts to exploit this quirk in the legislation's draftsmanship. In SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement
Co., the Supreme Court agreed with the SEC that the debtor in
question could not use Chapter XI, and seemed to foreclose publicly
held firms from that chapter.18 Managers continued to push the
boundaries of Chapter XI, however, and in General Stores Corp. v.
Shlensky, Justice Douglas stunned the SEC by ruling that the choice
of chapter depended on the "needs to be served." 18 9 He made clear
that even a publicly held corporation could invoke Chapter XI in an
appropriate case. 90 Although the SEC won on the facts of Shlensky,
the decision helped to ensure it would lose the war. By the 1960s and
184. See Chandler Act ch. 11, 52 Stat. 840, 905-16 (1938) (codified prior to repeal at 11
U.S.C. §§ 702-99 (1938)).
185. Chapter XI was largely the work of the National Bankruptcy Conference, and was an
outgrowth of the composition procedure that had long been part of the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter
XI contemplated a scale-down of unsecured debt, and consequently did not permit either secured
debt or equity interests to be altered. Congress amended the chapter in 1952 to make clear that
Chapter XI, unlike Chapter X, did not require adherence to the absolute priority rule. The
distinctions between the chapters are described in each of the Supreme Court decisions discused
below, and in a third decision, SEC v. America TrailerRentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 603-07 (1965).
186. Ironically, firms could be kept out of Chapter X because Section 130(7) required a
showing that the firm could not obtain adequate relief under Chapter XI. For an excellent
discussion, see Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate
Reorganization: ChaptersX andXl of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1362(1949).
187. See id. at 1335 n.3.
188. 310 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1940).
189. 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956).
190. See id. One of many intriguing questions raised by the case is why Douglas, the
former SEC chairman and architect of Chapter X, rejected the SEC's pleas that all publicly held
debtors be steered into Chapter X. The most likely explanation is that the holding reflected
Douglas' continued commitment to a flexible, "functionalist" approach to bankruptcy, and that
Douglas never anticipated the SEC's ultimate demise. See Skeel, supra note 183.
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early 1970s, the use of Chapter XI to reorganize publicly held firms
had become increasingly routine. 191
Why, in the two decades after the Chandler Act, did the SEC
begin to lose its grip over the reorganization of publicly held
corporations? To a certain extent the developments just described can
be attributed to historical accident. Not only did the drafters neglect

to explicitly steer public firms into Chapter X, but the United States
Realty & Improvement Co. decision may actually have thwarted the
SEC from closing the loophole. Prior to this case the SEC had
proposed corrective legislation, but Congress refrained from acting
based, apparently, on the view that legislative action was no longer
192
necessary.

In addition to-and probably more crucial than-these events
were several important institutional factors. The current managers of
a troubled firm and their lawyers had strong incentives to try for
Chapter XI, since this chapter would enable both to retain their positions. 19 Given the obvious intent that public firms use Chapter X
instead, one might not expect their prospects for success to be good.
Yet the managers and lawyers had a significant advantage over the

SEC in these jurisdictional disputes: the lower court judges who
decided these cases may themselves have preferred Chapter XI, since
Chapter X required the lower court to share authority with the SEC,
and also introduced significant delay into the process. 9 4 Moreover, in
the absence of a complicated capital structure or credible evidence of
managerial misbehavior, the ideological case for insisting on the
elaborate apparatus of Chapter X was weak. 95

191. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT] ("itis readily apparent that

Chapter XI has evolved into the dominant reorganization vehicle and very substantial debtors
are able to reorganize in Chapter XI"). This does not mean that the SEC had no role when firms
reorganized in Chapter XI. The SEC still could negotiate benefits for public investors in return
for its agreement not to challenge the firm's use of Chapter XI.
192. See H.R. REP. No. 76-2372, AT2 (1940).
193. An even better solution given the uncertainty of the gambit might be to do everything
possible to avoid bankruptcy altogether. This suggests that the public firm managers who
pushed for Chapter XI were likely to be those who simply could not avoid bankruptcy.
194. See generally Allen F. Corotto & Irving H. Picard, Business Reorganizantions Under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A New Approach to InvestorProtectionsand the Role of the
SEC, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, n.19 (1979) (noting that many of the appellate cases on the
Chapter X-XI choice followed lower court denials of SEC motions to transfer to Chapter X).
195. See, e.g., Melvin Robert Katskee, The Calculus of CorporateReorganization: Chapter
X v. XI and the Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 AM. BANER. L.J. 171, 176-80 (1971) (arguing that
Chapter X should be used in the event of serious allegations of managerial incompetence or
fraud, but not as a matter of course).
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It is important to emphasize that, even after Shlensky opened
the doors to Chapter XI, the Bankruptcy Act fell well short of a pure
ex post bankruptcy regime. Because the SEC continued to resist public firms' use of Chapter XI, and frequently succeeded, managers faced
196
significant uncertainty if the firm filed for bankruptcy.
One could characterize American corporate governance during
this time in similar terms. Corporate control contests had become far
more frequent, but the market for control was still very much developing and faced a variety of impediments. 197 With these caveats in
place, however, we can say with some confidence that the events of
this era removed any serious doubts as to whether American corporate governance would develop in an ex ante or an ex post direction.
By the end of this period, it became clear that market forces rather
than large shareholders would predominate in corporate governance,
and bankruptcy increasingly included a meaningful reorganization option.
To underscore the significance of these developments for this
Article's evolutionary story, consider a counterfactual example.
Suppose managers and their lawyers had failed to circumvent the
Chandler Act's manager-displacement provisions. How might firms'
approach to corporate governance have developed differently? The
analysis of this Article suggests that, in time, managers would have
kept the debt in their firms' capital structures low to minimize the
likelihood of bankruptcy, and turned increasingly to large
shareholders to diminish the risk of takeovers. Similarly, the credible
threat of manager-displacing bankruptcy would have reinforced
investors' incentive to acquire large stakes in publicly held firms. On
this reasoning, what might have emerged was, at least in theory, an
ex ante approach to corporate governance.

196. Mid-sized firms with publicly held securities, rather than large firms, first opened the
doors to Chapter XI. See Benjamin Weintraub & Harris Levin, A Sequel to ChapterX or
Chapter U7: Coexistence for the Middle-Sized Corporation, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 292 (1957)
(developing this theory); Benjamin Weintraub et al., ChapterX or ChapterXI: Coexistence for
the Middle-Sized Corporation,24 FORDHAM L. REv. 616 (1956) (same); Benjamin Weintraub &
Harris Levin, Reorganizationor Arrangement: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends in Recent
Cases, 37 REF. J. 103 (1963) (same).

197. In addition to a general corporate culture that still frowned on hostile raids in many
respects, courts toyed with doctrinal devices that would have had a chilling effect on changes of
control. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (suggesting buyers of
controlling stock interests might be required to make same offer to minority shareholders); see
also Rostow, supra note 177, at 46-48.
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F. The View from the End of the Twentieth Century
Subsequent developments have strongly reinforced the ex post
orientation of American corporate law. In bankruptcy the pivotal
event came in 1978, when Congress completely overhauled the bankruptcy laws by enacting 8the current Bankruptcy Code to replace the
19
former Bankruptcy Act.
The Code's most important effect was to dramatically streamline bankruptcy's reorganization option-in ways that make it far
more palatable to the managers of a troubled firm. Rather than two
reorganization chapters, the Code includes only one-Chapter 11.199
Not only does Chapter 11 all but eliminate the role of the SEC,2°° but
it also adopts a strong presumption that a firm's current managers,
rather than a trustee, will be the ones to run the firm in bankruptcy.201 To smooth the road to reorganization, Chapter 11 also re-

laxes the requirements of the absolute priority rule.202
To appreciate Chapter l1's dramatic shift from the Chandler
Act vision of corporate bankruptcy, the best place to start is with the
single most influential interest group-bankruptcy lawyers. Because
bankruptcy lawyers represent different kinds of clients-usually
either creditors or debtors-they bring a variety of perspectives to
bear. Yet, whatever their other differences, lawyers for both creditors
and debtors are likely to favor a meaningful reorganization option,
since their practice depends on it.203

198. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)).
199. For a discussion in public choice terms of the debate whether to retain two corporate
reorganization chapters or to enact only one, see Posner, supra note 150 at 108-118.
200. The SEC retains the right to be heard in Chapter 11 cases, see Bankruptcy Code §
1109, but it has no special authority to review plans or to exercise oversight in other ways. For
a scathing criticism in the popular media of the Bankruptcy Code and its removal of SEC
oversight, see Anne Colamosca, The Bankruptcy Hustle, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1979, at 15.
201. Bankruptcy Code § 1101 treats the debtor as a "debtor-in-possession" when it files for
Chapter 11 relief, and Bankruptcy Code § 1107 gives the debtor-in-possession all of the powers
of a trustee. Trustees can only be appointed for cause, see Bankruptcy Code § 1104(aX1), and
their appointment in Chapter 11 is very much the exception, see Skeel, Nature, supra note 5, at
512 n.199.
202. Whereas Chapter X required that the absolute priority rule be satisfied in every case,
the rule comes into play in Chapter 11 only with respect to a class of creditors or shareholders
that votes against the reorganization plan. See Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b).
203. In effect, bankruptcy lawyers serve as agents for their potential clients, creditors and
debtors, in the lobbying process. But their agency is quite imperfect. Not only do attorneys
reflect the views of actual debtors rather than healthy firms, but they also benefit from a costly
bankruptcy process even if their clients do not. See Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and
Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 INTL REv. L. ECON. 381 (1992) (considering level of legal
complexity that maximizes lawyers' income).
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It is important to keep in mind that the bankruptcy bar that
lobbied for the current Bankruptcy Code was quite different from the
corporate reorganization bar of the 1930s. Ironically, by transforming
the bankruptcy bar from a domain of elite Wall Street lawyers to a
less prestigious but broader-based practice, the New Deal reformers
may have enhanced the bar's influence. By the 1970s, the corporate
reorganization bar was much larger and more difficult to attack as an
insular elite.
The managers of potential debtors were, even more than in the
1930s, conspicuously absent from the legislative process. As discussed earlier, the most obvious explanation for their otherwise puzzling silence is that the representatives of potentially troubled debtors
are unlikely to both recognize their status in advance and identify
o4
themselves.2
The only important interest group that sought to retain the
more elaborate administrative apparatus of Chapter X was the SEC.
But the SEC's influence was greatly diminished by this time and its
cries for regulatory supervision of large corporation bankruptcies
2

went unheeded. 05

Ideology may also have played an indirect role in the 1978
Code. Recall that two sometimes clashing ideological threads tend to
come together in bankruptcy-a general antipathy toward large businesses and the desire to give failed businesses a second chance. 2 5 By
the 1970s, the former concern played little role (in part because banks
and Wall Street law firms were a distant memory in bankruptcy).
Congress was thus less troubled by the elimination of SEC oversight
than it might otherwise have been, and the general background sentiment favoring reorganization of troubled businesses counseled for
the more flexible reorganization provisions that eventually passed.
The recent history of American corporate governance has
tended in a very similar direction. The proxy contests of the 1950s
gave way to takeovers in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s,
takeovers mushroomed due, among other reasons, to the advent of
204. The contrast between bankruptcy and a hostile takeover is instructive in this regard.
During the 1980s, the managers of many, and perhaps most, publicly held corporations saw
their firms as potential takeover targets. Managers therefore lobbied vigorously in support of,
and in fact generally initiated, the anti-takeover statutes that many states enacted. See
Roberta Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 136-38 (1987).
Creditors generally supported the efforts to streamline reorganization, which they saw as a
way to reduce the costs of the bankruptcy process. See Posner, supra note 150, at 117-18; see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 411 (1990)

(arguing that creditors got what they wanted in chapter 11).
205. See Posner, supra note 150, at 117-18.
206. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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high-yield debt and the Justice Department's diminished use of the
antitrust laws to challenge horizontal mergers during the Reagan
presidency. 2 7 At the same time, incentive-based compensation has
become even more widespread, managers have increased the debt in
firms' capital structures, and managerial and labor markets have
become increasingly fluid. 20 8

There have been important counter-

trends as well-the most prominent being states' enactment of antitakeover statutes that significantly impede hostile takeovers. 209 But

American corporate governance as a whole has all the indicia of a
classic ex post system.
This description of the evolution of ex post governance in
America is not intended to suggest that a nation's corporate governance system will evolve relentlessly in an ex post or ex ante direction.
Even in this condensed history of the American system, there are
shifts in direction-as in the Chandler Act's reversal of the much
broader reorganization option that had been provided under the
short-lived Section 77B. In a more exhaustive history, one could explore many more examples of partial shifts.
This Article intends, instead, to show how and why the ex post
system now in place has developed as it has, and to support the claim
that changes in the nature of corporate bankruptcy are likely to accompany corporate governance changes, and vice versa, due to the
complementary relationship between them. As the analysis has suggested, ex post corporate governance and bankruptcy have evolved
together. While the correspondence is not perfect, developments in
one have paralleled changes in the other at each stage.

207. See Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascinationwith Corporate Governance, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 374 (1996).
208. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 6.2, at 200-06 (1986) (describing

increased use of incentive compensation and tax changes influencing use of stock options);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some
Evidence from the InternationalData, 50 J. FIN. 1421, 1449-50 (1995) (describing increase in

leverage between 1984 and 1991).
209. The shifting stance of the Delaware courts toward hostile takeovers has been a
similarly important factor. After imposing relatively stringent obligations on the directors of a
target firm to consider unwanted takeover bids in the mid 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court
gave directors more leeway at the end of the decade. For a discussion of Delaware decision
making in corporate law with a particular emphasis on the court's takeover cases, see David A.
Skeel, Jr., A Unanimity Norm in DelawareCorporationLaw, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997).
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF Ex ANTE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN
AND GERMANY

Having considered at some length the historical developments
that have produced America's ex post corporate law framework, our
focus will now shift to Japan and Germany. As with American corporate law, the secondary literature on the history of Japanese and
German corporate law is still relatively undeveloped. Even with this
constraint, the overview is quite suggestive.
For both Japan and Germany, World War II was the pivotal
event defining the current landscape of corporate law and corporate
bankruptcy. In the wake of the war and the economic devastation it
left, corporate governance patterns changed in important respects in
both countries. This is not to say that the post-war period was a complete break from the two countries' previous approaches to corporate
law. To the contrary, the general trend in each nation prior to the
war was in an ex ante direction. The post-war changes led in the
same direction, though with striking adjustments in each country.
A. Japan: Ex Ante Governance with a New Face
Prior to World War II, the most striking feature of Japanese
corporate governance was the prominence of a handful of
zaibatsu-family dominated corporate groups that generally spanned
several industries. Interestingly, recent research suggests that the
zaibatsu controlled less of Japan's industry than is commonly
believed, and that the securities markets served as a relatively
important source of financing.210 Nevertheless, corporate governance

had strong ex ante characteristics, as the zaibatsu were family
controlled and large shareholders took an active interest in managing
most non-zaibatsufirms.2 11

The first major changes in the structure of the Japanese securities markets came in connection with the wartime planning of the
1930s. Government initiatives designed to increase saving squeezed
small shareholders out of the market, and the Japanese government
actively intervened in corporate governance. 212

The government or-

210. See Okazaki, supra note 39, at 351-52 (only 10 of 60 of the largest mining and manu-

facturing firms were zaibatsu-related;30-40 percent of the funds for all firms came from the
capital markets).
211. See id. at 352-54.
212. See id. at 362-75.
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ganized loan syndicates headed by the Bank of Japan213 and designated which financial institutions would finance each munitions corporation. 214 The overall effect was to greatly diminish market liquidity and to reinforce the ex ante nature of Japanese corporate governance.
Japanese bankruptcy followed a similar pattern. In the
decades prior to World War II, Japanese lawmakers enacted two
different composition provisions. The first was enacted in 1899,215 and
the second dates to 1922.216 Both are simplified procedures designed
only for small businesses. In striking contrast to the United States,
there is little evidence of a movement to expand the bankruptcy
process to facilitate the reorganization of large, troubled firms. Firms
either resolved their financial distress privately or they were
liquidated.
By the time of the Allied Occupation, Japanese corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy had developed in a decisively ex
ante direction. With the Allied Occupation came a dramatically different impulse. During the occupation, the United States required
Japan to enact many of our financial reforms. The Japanese version
of Glass-Steagall drove a wedge between commercial and investment
banking and imposed the same limits on stock ownership by
banks-no more than five percent of any corporation-that American
banks face. 217 On the bankruptcy side, Japan enacted Chapter X of
the Chandler Act. 218 In short, the occupation imposed on Japan nearly
all of the reforms from which America's ex post system subsequently
emerged.
Unlike the United States, however, Japanese corporate
governance never developed in an ex post direction. Although banks
could hold only limited amounts of a corporation's stock, they evaded
these limitations by participating in keiretsu-the extensive crossholdings that characterize many of Japan's most prominent
businesses .219
Rather than discouraging this development, the

213. See id. at 369. As Okazaki notes, there are obvious parallels between this practice and
the main bank system that emerged after World War II.
214. See id. at 371.
215. See Shoho (Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899, §§ 381 et seq.
216. See Wagiho [Composition act], Law No. 72 of 1922. Whereas the 1899 composition
provisions were limited to corporations, the 1922 procedure is general in scope. For a brief but
useful description of each, see Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish
Chapter11? The Evidence FromJapan,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 115-16 (1994).
217. See, Roe, Some Differences, supra note 36, at 1951-52.
218. See Kaisha Koseiho [Corporate reorganization act], Law No. 172 of 1952.
219. See Gilson & Roe, Overlaps, supranote 39.
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government has been an active participant.
The government
participates in the relational governance process through ongoing,
20
informal contacts with the main banks and the firms they monitor.
Thus, though the face of Japanese corporate governance looks much
different than it did before World War II, its ex ante characteristics
have remained in fall force.
The path of Japan's corporate reorganization provisions has
been entirely consistent with its ex ante corporate governance.
Whereas American firms began to evade Chapter X in the 1950s,
Japan has retained the full force of the provisions as originally
enacted. 221 The managers of a firm that invokes the provisions are
invariably replaced by a trustee and the few troubled, publicly held
firms that wind up in bankruptcy are nearly always liquidated.222
The story thus far suggests that banks and the managers of
large firms have consistently had their way in Japanese corporate
governance, subject to ongoing government intervention. Yet this is
not entirely the case. As in the United States, populist sympathies
have periodically left their mark on corporate governance. Yet in
striking contrast, the effect of populism has been to enhance the
status of labor, without attacking either the influence of banks or the
concentrated ownership of prominent firms. Thus, labor has long
enjoyed a much greater voice in corporate governance in Japan than
in the United States. 223 Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe have recently
speculated that lifetime employment may have emerged in the 1950s
as an initiative by conservative businessmen designed to quell labor
2
unrest that threatened to turn in a radical direction. 2

Translating the developments just described into the institutional terms used in Part III provides further insight into Japanese
corporate governance and the way it has developed. First, consider
the relevant interest groups. Banks and the managers of firms have
been consistently influential, due both to the economic power they
wield and to the close, symbiotic relationship between business and
government-evidenced most vividly by the practice in smaller firms

220. Milhaupt, supra note 61, at 28.
221. See Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 216, at 116 (corporate reorganization is based

on former Chapter X and "is a rigid proceeding... [that] almost always entails a change of management).
222. See id.
223. See Okazaki, supranote 39, at 363.
224. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, at 30-31 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file

with author) (lifetime employment possibly used to "crack[ ] labor solidarity").
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of appointing retiring bureaucrats to their boards. 225 The most visible
competing interest group is labor. The ex ante system that has
emerged can be seen as a compromise among the parties' interests. In
return for protection against external threats such as takeovers,
managers
tolerate
bank
oversight
and
liquidation-based
226
bankruptcy, and labor tolerates financial concentration in return for
benefits such as lifetime employment.
Second, structural constraints reinforce the ex ante arrangement. Japan's geography, particularly its small size and its political
tradition of centralized power, have precluded the formation of influential local interest groups comparable to the local banks that have
figured so prominently in American corporate law history. With the
potential exception of labor,22 7 there is no obvious, powerful constituency for fragmentation. Liquidation-based bankruptcy is a natural
adjunct to this, since it cements the relationship between banks and
2
the firms they monitor. 2
Finally, and perhaps tautologically, ex ante governance can be
seen as a reflection of the toleration of economic concentration and
stigmatization of failure that form the ideological underpinnings of
these historical developments.
B. Germany: The Marriageof Banks and Business
To understand the emergence of Germany's ex ante corporate
governance framework, we must begin with that nation's
longstanding pattern of powerful financial institutions. Dating back
to the nineteenth century, German banks have wielded enormous
power as financers and shareholders of German corporations. 229
Prior to World War II, the attributes of ex ante governance
were largely in place. On the corporate law side, banks and other
large shareholders figured prominently in corporate governance,20
225. See Milhaupt, supra note 61, at 29.
226. See Sheard, supra note 43, at 318-20 (describing protection from takeovers as an

important characteristic of Japanese cross-shareholdings).
227. Recall that in one account of Japanese labor history, labor was bought off, in effect, by
business leaders' decision to implement lifetime employment. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 224,
at 27-35. If lifetime employment were to disappear, as some predict, labor might more aggressively challenge the current framework.
228. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
229. See DeLong, supra note 22, at 228 ("the role played by the great banks in monitoring
and supervising corporate managements was an accepted part of German financial theory in the
years before World War 1"); see generally Richard Tilly, Banking Institutions in Historical and
Comparative Perspective: Germany, Great Britain,and the United States in the Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 145 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 189 (1989).
230. See DeLong, supra note 22, at 228.
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while capital markets were insufficiently liquid to allow for ex post
governance mechanisms such as takeovers. The German bankruptcy
system was fully consistent with this. The principal bankruptcy statute, which dated to 1879, provided solely for piecemeal liquidation.31
Like the rest of Germany's economy, the corporate governance
framework was roiled by the years around World War II, which included both hyperinflation and the economic devastation left by the
war. At the end of the war, the capital markets were all but nonexistent and most of Germany's business was in shambles. 232 It was in the
rebuilding of the German economy that German corporate governance
might plausibly have developed in a different direction, perhaps with
active markets and a diminished bank role. But as in Japan,
Germany retained its ex ante framework, and did so at least in part
through a rapprochement between business leaders and labor.
In Germany, rather than socializing or fragmenting industry,
the government implemented co-determination on a national basis in
1951.233
In addition to the "works councils" that already assured
workers an audience with a corporation's management board, co-determination provided direct representation for labor on the
supervisory boards of substantial German corporations. 34 With codetermination, workers expanded their voice in corporate governance,
and any populist sentiment for fragmenting the nation's financial
institutions was diffused.
Developments in German bankruptcy law complicate the
analysis slightly, but prove fully consistent with the version of ex ante

231. The statute, the Konkursordnung (KO) was promulgated in 1877 and became effective
on October 1, 1879. See Maximilian Schiessl, On the Road to a New German Reorganization
Law-A Comparative Analysis of the Draft Proposed by the Insolvenzrechts Kommission and
Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 235 (1988).
232. See Jurgen G. Backhaus, Co-Determination in Germany: 1949-1979 and There
Beyond: Bonding or Compulsion, at 2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
233. "Co-determination" refers to mandatory representation of employees in corporate
governance, usually on a corporation's board of directors. Co-determination did not emerge in
Germany in 1951 for the first time. Board representation for employees had been implemented
in 1922, and several German states had enacted co-determination provisions in the period prior
to 1951. See id. at 2.
234. Large German corporations generally have two boards, a management board (the
"Vorstand") that makes most corporate decisions, and a supervisory board (the "Aufsichtsratr)
that makes appointments to the management board and approves the annual dividend. For a
useful description, see JONATHAN P. CLARItAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF
CoRPoRATE GOVERNANcE IN FIVE CouNTRiEs 17-25 (1994).
Some commentators have argued that co-determination would not prove effective in the
absence of a two-tier board, since the worker representatives on a single-tier board would be on
both sides of labor negotiations. On a two-tier board, by contrast, the labor representatives
serve on the supervisory board, whereas labor negotiates with the management board. See
Backhaus, supranote 232, at 16.
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governance that emerged on the corporate side. In 1935, Germany
added a composition provision to its bankruptcy laws in response to
repeated calls for a statutory mechanism for reorganizing troubled
businesses. 235 Although the composition statute is, in form, a simplified reorganization provision,236 in practice it immediately displaces
managers and invariably leads to liquidation of large corporations
237
that file for bankruptcy.
German bankruptcy law will include a much more extensive
reorganization procedure as of 1999, when the Insolvenzordung enacted in 1994238 takes effect, and subsumes the two existing bankruptcy statutes.2 9 Although the statute was explicitly derived from
the American Chapter 11, it differs in striking and revealing respects.
For instance, the German provision provides for a firm's managers to
be replaced by an administrator,20 and every case must begin as a
liquidation.241 Moreover, a request by creditors to liquidate the firm
explicitly trumps any reorganization plan.242 Despite the fanfare attending the new statute,243 German bankruptcy law clearly will retain
its harsh, manager-displacing character even after the reforms take
effect, and the general pattern of ex ante governance will remain fully
in place.
From the perspectives of our three institutional factors, the
evolution of German corporate governance looks broadly similar to the
evolution of Japanese corporate governance. Banks and corporate
managers have had particular influence and the interests of labor
have been addressed in a way that preserves the influence of concentrated banks. The ideological backdrop-a general tolerance of concentration, aversion to failure, and concern for the status of employees-can also be seen as broadly similar.
But there are some intriguing differences as well. First, the
government has somewhat less of an ongoing role in Germany than in
235. See The Vergleichsordnung of 1935, v. 2.26.1935 (RGB1. I S.321); Schiessl, supra note
231, at 238.
236. It applies only if a company can pay a substantial percentage of its unsecured obliga-

tions and must be invoked within three weeks of the time when a firm's managers become
aware of its insolvency. See Schiessl, supra note 231, at 238-39.
237. See id. at 239.
238. See Bundesgesetzblatt, v. 1994 (BGB1. I S.2866).
239. For a good description, see Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act:
Insolvenzordnang, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 417 (1996).
240. See id. at 426.
241. See id. at 424.
242. See id at 430.

243. Interestingly, insolvency practitioners vigorously opposed the changes, apparently
because the new statute will shift power from an administrator to a firm's creditors. See id. at
435.
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Japan,244 which suggests that German firms may have somewhat
more freedom from governmental policy concerns. Second, while
Germany, like Japan, has a tradition of centralized rule, its politics
now are more federalized-localities have significant influence. In
view of this, one could imagine local interests taking aim at banks
and large business, as in the United States. For the most part, however, they have not. This may be because large firms are a source of
tax revenues and of stable employment for the communities in which
they are located.2 4
Further, the historical conditions from which the existing
German framework emerged may reinforce the disinclination to attack bank concentration. In addition to the manager-displacing orientation of German bankruptcy law, another impediment to enacting a
more flexible regime is the rigid adherence to the absolute priority
rule, which makes it difficult to preserve a stake for shareholders.
The commitment to absolute priority reflects a view that banks and
other creditors, rather than shareholders, financed German corporations after World War II, and thus that shareholders have no moral
right to share in any bankruptcy recovery. 246
As these differences suggest, the ex ante systems in Japan and
Germany are a reflection of the distinct histories of the two countries.
The histories underscore that neither ex ante nor ex post governance is
economically inevitable.
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
The preceding Parts have explored the distinct approaches to
corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy in ex ante and ex post
regimes, first in the abstract and then in historical terms. The rapid
growth of international markets in recent years raises the obvious
question of whether the current striking distinctions will endure. Are
the different governance systems stable, or will each evolve in an ex
post or ex ante direction, or toward some intermediate framework?
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the analysis that follows suggests that the current patterns will prove remarkably stable.

244. Germany lacks the tradition of Administrative Guidance and Japanese firms' pattern
of appointing ex-bureaucrats to their boards of directors. See supra note 69 and accompanying
text (describing Administrative Guidance).
245. See Backhaus, supra note 232, at 16 (describing the symbiotic relationship between
corporations and local communities).
246. Conversation with Professor Fritz Kubler (Dec. 1997).
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Particularly in the nations we have considered, the prospects for
significant change from the status quo seem quite limited absent a
transformation of existing institutional constraints. My prediction
that American corporate governance will retain its ex post character,
and that Japan and Germany will remain ex ante systems, leads us
back to the crucial question of whether one of the approaches is likely
to be more efficient.
A. How Stable are the Ex Ante and Ex Post Systems?
The question of whether existing governance systems are stable raises two closely related issues. The first is whether the legal
and political constraints that helped to produce the existing framework will eventually disappear. Will the New Deal restrictions on
financial intermediaries erode in the United States, for instance, and
how would their removal affect American corporate governance?
Second, even apart from systemic change, can or will firms themselves contract around the existing framework or evade it in other
ways? The analysis that follows will consider each of these questions,
starting once again with the United States.
1. Institutional Stability Against the Odds
Enormous pressure has mounted in recent years to roll back
many of the New Deal financial reforms, in large part because they
increasingly hamper the competitiveness of banks against alternative
forms of financing, such as issuing commercial paper.24 7 Banks now
have broad flexibility to branch across state lines, 248 and the Glass-

Steagall barriers separating commercial and investment banking
have eroded in significant respects.2 9 At the same time, other institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds, and pen-

247. The irony of commercial banks' predicament is that the New Deal reforms initially assured banks almost continuous profits, since they gave commercial banks a virtual monopoly
over traditional banking activities such as making loans. But as alternative forms of financing

proliferated, commercial banks' inability to engage in activities such as underwriting diminished their ability to compete. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures,Risk
Monitoring,and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1169-71 (1988).

248. The Riegle-Neal Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) will allow unlimited branching except in states that opt out of its provisions. For a good description of the Act and its effect, see Mark D. Rollinger, InterstateBanking
and Branchingunder the Riegle-NealAct of 1994, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996).

249. Most prominently, the Federal Reserve has adopted a series of regulations easing the
restrictions on commercial banks' ability to acquire investment-banking subsidiaries (referred to
as "Section 20 subsidiaries"). The trend has triggered a flurry ofacquisition activity.
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sion funds have accumulated increasingly large equity stakes in many
U.S. corporations.2c°
While these developments have already had significant effects,
it would be a mistake to conclude they will lead in easy steps to
Japanese or German-style corporate governance. In banking, for
instance, interest groups such as local bankers that supported efforts
to fragment large banks would continue to oppose bank concentration.
The New Deal reforms also gave other interest groups-investment
banks and insurance companies, for instance-a strong interest in the
status quo. 251 The influence of these groups, together with the contin-

ued antipathy toward concentrated banks, makes it unlikely that
United States banks will achieve anything like the influence their
2
counterparts wield in Japan and Germany.
In contrast to banks, other institutional investors have taken a
more active role in corporate governance. Public pensions such as
CALPers, for instance, helped to remove the chief executives of several prominent corporations. Yet institutional investors as a whole
have strong disincentives to engage in active relational governance.2sS
The picture in bankruptcy is similar in many respects, but far
more strongly aligned in favor of the status quo. In recent years, an
increasing number of commentators have excoriated the perceived
inefficiency of Chapter 11-style reorganization. 2m Based on recent
insights in corporate finance, most have proposed some form of liquidation-based bankruptcy framework that would displace managers (or

250. A 1991 study found that institutional investors hold 53 percent of all the publicly
traded stock in U.S. corporations. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise
of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827 n.27 (1992); C. BRANCATO & P.
GAUGHAN, INSTITUTIONAL INvEsTORS AND CAPiTAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE, tbl.10 (Columbia
Law School Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law and Economic Studies, Sept. 1991).
251. In recent years, lobbying by insurance companies has been the single most visible
impediment to the elimination of Glass-Steagall Act barriers on the products banks can offer.
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, House G.O.P. Narrowing Bill on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1995, at D1 (insurance companies successfully resist broad bill that would have reversed GlassSteagall).
252. See Roe, A PoliticalTheory, supra note 21, at 65 (expressing a similar view).
253. An enormous amount of literature has developed around the question of whether
institutional investors should or will play an active role in American corporate governance in
coming years. The first to note the disincentives faced by institutions other than public pension
funds was Ed Rock. See Rock, supra note 54. Bernie Black developed his more optimistic view
in a series of articles that began appearing at the same time. See Black, supra note 21; Black,
supra note 250. The most recent contribution is Thomas Smith's argument that institutional
investors' passivity stems less from political and legislative obstacles than from their customers'
desire that the institutions eschew risk. See Smith, supranote 27.
254. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for references to some of this literature.
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at the least, seriously destabilize their authority) as an alternative to
255
the current regime.
The existing institutional dynamic is so heavily biased in favor
of an ex post approach to corporate bankruptcy, however, that it is
difficult to imagine significant legislative change. The most prominent interest group, bankruptcy lawyers, has strong professional
incentives to preserve Chapter 11 in its current form, as do bankruptcyjudges.2 6 If Chapter 11 is as inefficient as many commentators
believe, one might expect creditors to lobby for reform. Yet, because
creditors pass on the effects of inefficiency or increased efficiency to
their borrowers, the principal interest of the creditors is in the transition costs of reform.2 7 As a result, unless their sunk costs are unusually high, creditors have often been more interested in streamlining
258
the existing system than with seeking significant reform.
Ideological factors strongly reinforce the American tendency
toward manager-driven, reorganization-based bankruptcy. At least
since the nineteenth century railroad receiverships, the background
ideology has favored a reorganization option rather than simply
liquidating distressed frms.259
Notice that the stability of ex post bankruptcy also has a stabilizing effect on the market-driven nature of American corporate law.
In addition to the other reasons to doubt any imminent shift toward
Japanese or German-style governance, the existence of a managerdriven reorganization option undermines the effectiveness of the large
stake-holdings that characterize an ex ante regime, and diminishes
managers' need to invite the intrusion of large, active shareholders. 260

255. See sources cited supra note 50; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra
note 175.
256. This is not to suggest that bankruptcy attorneys' or judges' motives are in any way
malignant. Most believe strongly in the virtues of the existing framework, but this belief
inevitably is conditioned by their own practice. See KOMESAR, supra note 104, at 58-65
(discussing the relationship between institutional constraints and motive).
257. For a more detailed discussion, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the
Shape ofAmerican Bankruptcy, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming, 1998).
258. Another context where creditors may take an active interest is where a proposed
change may affect their market share vis-A-vis a competing form of credit. For evidence of this
in connection with the 1978 Code, see Posner, supra note 150, at 76 (banks supported limited
right ofredemption, which could undermine interests of commercial finance companies); see also
Peter V. Letsou, The PoliticalEconomy of Consumer CreditRegulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 63136 (1995) (describing competing lobbying interests of banks and finance companies).
259. Structural factors similarly favor the existing ex post framework. Not only have the
original constitutional obstacles to reorganization disappeared, but the current framework also
gives bankruptcy judges and the bankruptcy bar an enormous stake in its survival.
260. See supra Part II.B (discussing importance of manager-displacing bankruptcy to ex
ante governance, due to the leverage it gives relational investors).
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In sum, while American corporate governance, like that of
other nations, is subject to continual, limited variation through time,
its general ex post character appears to be remarkably stable.
2. Evading the Framework Through Private Ordering
Even if dramatic change in U.S. corporate governance is
unlikely, individual firms may nevertheless devise alternative structures through private ordering. It is therefore important to consider
how easily firms can or do opt out of the relevant system. There are
significant limitations on the ease and the benefits of opting out.
In a much discussed article written at the end of the 1980s
takeover boom, Michael Jensen argued that in maturing industries,
American firms increasingly would opt out of traditional governance
patterns by eschewing the Berle-Means corporation in favor of concentrated shareholding by entrepreneurial managers. 261 The rise of
Leveraged Buyout ("LBO") firms provided his principal illustration.
LBO partnerships, such as Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts, acquire firms
through takeovers and then install their own managers or give the
existing managers compensation packages that are closely tied to
performance. By reducing the separation between ownership and
control, LBO firms diminish managerial agency costs and seem to
offer a dramatically more efficient alternative to the traditional
262
publicly held firm.

While LBO firms have figured prominently in American corporate law, they have had little of the transformative effect Jensen envisioned. This is due in part to difficulties in finding suitable takeover
targets. 263 Moreover, because the partners of an LBO firm cannot
themselves manage all of the companies, the firm must delegate
managerial responsibility, which at least partially reintroduces
managerial agency cost problems.264 Finally, the heavy concentration

261. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61.
262. See id. at 68-70; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies
as GuardianShareholders: The Place of the MSIC in CorporateGovernanceDebate, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 985 (1993) (discussing Swedish analogue to LBO associations and the obstacles to such a
strategy in the United States).
263. This difficulty is magnified by state anti-takeover statutes, and to a somewhat lesser
extent by Delaware's takeover jurisprudence, each of which make it more costly to pursue a
hostile bid. Roberta Romano's extensive review of existing studies found that bidders make
relatively low profits on average from takeovers. See Romano, supra note 204.
264. The performance-based incentives LBO firms give to managers significantly enhance
their accountability, as Jensen notes, see Jensen, supra note 261, at 68-69; but the managers
still are managers rather than full owners of the firm.
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of debt required to finance the initial acquisition significantly constrains managerial flexibility. In practice, LBO firms have often
taken their companies public after restructuring them, serving as a
transition vehicle rather than an alternative to the Berle-Means corporation.65
The LBO firms illustrate some of the practical obstacles to
concentrated shareholding in a regulatory regime that thwarts the
most likely candidate, financial intermediaries, from playing this role.
Moreover, successfully opting out of ex post governance would require

not just concentrated shareholding, but also that the firm commit

itself to not invoke the Bankruptcy Code's reorganization option. 266

Yet, much as with concentrated shareholding, there are major practical and legal obstacles to foregoing the reorganization-based bankruptcy regime.
The chief obstacle to opting out of Chapter 11 is the longstanding rule that debtors cannot waive their right to file a bankruptcy
petition.27 Courts have sometimes enforced efforts to opt out of the
Code, but the exceptions have been limited to contexts far afield of
publicly held firms.268 For a publicly held firm, opting out would at a
265. For a suggestion that Money Trust banks such as J.P. Morgan and Company played
an intriguingly similar role (though without taking as large an equity stake) early in the
century, see Charles F. Sabel, Comment, in INSIDE THE BusINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at
243-46 (commenting on DeLong, supra note 22).
266. Jensen has suggested that LBO firms would structure the firms they acquire in such a
way as to "privatize" bankruptcy. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBO's, and the
Privatizationof Bankruptcy, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Spring 1989, at 34, 41-44. But, as the
discussion below suggests, it is all but impossible to insulate a firm from Chapter 11 if it has
any outside shareholders. Even if this were not the case, devising a firm's capital structure
principally to avoid the need for Chapter 11 is an odd strategy for an operating firm.
Interestingly, Morgan appears to have been fully aware of the destabilizing effect corporate
reorganization has on ex ante governance. The Morgan partners took extraordinary steps to
keep the firms they monitored from defaulting. See Sabel, supra note 265, at 246.
267. See, e.g., Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (no waiver); In re Peli, 31
Bankr. 952, 956 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (no waiver).
268. A growing number of cases have addressed the question of whether to enforce a prebankruptcy waiver of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. Enforcing such a provision
enables a creditor to foreclose immediately, despite the bankruptcy filing. The cases thus far
have nearly all involved individuals or very small firms who agreed to the provision in connection with a pre-bankruptcy workout. For an argument that stay waivers should be enforceable
if adequate notice is provided to other creditors, see Robert K Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 97-101
(1995), and Marshall E. Tracht, ContractualBankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice,
and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 335-39 (1997).
In addition to stay waivers, there is also growing interest in the issue of whether structured
finance transactions can be insulated from bankruptcy. But these transactions generally
involve only a subset of a firm's assets (usually receivables), and do not directly affect the ability
of the firm itself to file for bankruptcy. For a discussion of these issues, and proposed standards
for determining whether firms can opt out of bankruptcy, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Freedom to
Contract About Bankruptcy (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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minimum require that a firm secure the direct or indirect consent of
each of its creditors. This is a particularly difficult obstacle for large
firmS

2 69

One can imagine clever ways to attempt to evade the nonwaivability of bankruptcy. For example, prior to going public, a firm
might adopt a provision requiring unanimous consent of its directors
as a prerequisite to filing for bankruptcy.2 0 Yet such a provision
could not prevent an involuntary filing, and a shareholder could argue
that the directors' fiduciary duties compelled them to file for
bankruptcy. 271 It is not without reason that bankruptcy practitioners
believe they can navigate any substantial firm into Chapter 11.
In short, American firms that attempt to opt out of the ex post
governance system face enormous practical and legal obstacles. The
obstacles are not absolute; some publicly held firms do deviate from
the Berle-Means model, and some can at least partially limit the
availability of Chapter 11. But the vast majority of large firms remain fully within the ex post framework of generally passive shareholders and retain a reorganization option in the event of financial
distress.
3. Reform or Opting Out in Japan and Germany
In both Japan and Germany, there are similarly powerful constraints on opting out. On the corporate governance side, perhaps the
largest obstacle to opting out is financing. The same banks that hold
large stakes in industrial corporations are also the primary source of
financing. 272 In consequence, a firm that seeks to keep its bank at
arms-length would seriously limit its access to capital. To be sure, the
269. It is especially difficult when involuntary creditors are taken into account, given that
they by definition do not have an opportunity to consent.
270. This is one of the strategies used in structured finance. For a discussion, see STEVEN
L. ScHwARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECUIrIZATION 1624(1990).
271. Even if most or all of the directors represent a constituency committed to avoiding
Chapter 11, their duties as directors require them to act in the best interests of the firm. This
may therefore obligate them to file for bankruptcy.
The ongoing Marvel bankruptcy illustrates yet another strategy. In Marvel, the bankruptcy court permitted the firm's bondholders (led by Carl Icahn) to foreclose on the stock
pledged to secure their bonds. The effect of this has been to give the bondholders control of the
case, much as creditors controlled many equity receiverships earlier in this century. This does
not mean that creditors can routinely use stock pledges to foreclose a debtor's Chapter 11
option. The foreclosure in Marvel required court approval, which in many cases would not be
given, and the bondholders still must use the Chapter 11 process in their own effort to
reorganize. For a discussion of Marvel and its complexities, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy
Courtsand Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1998).
272. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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securities markets in both Japan and Germany have expanded significantly in recent years, so that banks no longer have quite the
stranglehold on finance that they enjoyed in the past. In Japan,
moreover, many and perhaps most of the principal banks have been in
deep financial trouble themselves in recent years. Even so, banks are
still sufficiently dominant that firms which resist bank oversight
would put themselves at a competitive disadvantage.273
On the bankruptcy side, there is no existing interest group in
either Japan or Germany that seems likely to mirror the role that the
bankruptcy bar and bankruptcy judges play in promoting managerdriven, reorganization-based bankruptcy in the United States. 274
Moreover, banks are a powerful interest group in both countries, and
they have a vested interest in manager-displacing bankruptcy as a
means of solidifying their influence in corporate governance. 275 In an
ex ante framework, there is no obvious need for a well-developed
bankruptcy regime, manager-driven or otherwise. Because a few
large creditors often hold most of a firm's debt, the kinds of collective
action problems that serve as the principal justification for American
bankruptcy law276 arguably do not exist.
As with American firms, the path of least resistance is to accede to the existing framework, and the vast majority of large
Japanese and German firms do just that.

273. A similar analysis would apply for non-bank keiretsu in Japan. A firm that resisted
the influence of a main bank, and also avoided the extensive cross-holdings-and cross-control-of a non-bank keiretsu, would face a major competitive disadvantage.
An interesting question is whether Japanese and German corporations will begin to look
less to local securities markets and more to international ones as an alternative to relational
monitoring. For instance, Japanese and German firms could quite plausibly issue stock in the
United States. Thus far, relatively few firms have taken this step. One possible explanation is
that managers are comfortable with the existing approach, perhaps in part because they can
minimize intervention by keeping the relational monitors happy. Cultural factors may also play
a role.
274. More precisely, neither country has nearly so substantial and powerful a bankruptcy
bar as does the United States. In both countries, the bankruptcy process is far more administrative, and lawyers do not play a substantial role.
275. As discussed earlier, see supra Part IV.B, Germany has recently added a chapter 11like reorganization provision. Like Japan's reorganization chapter, it assumes the removal of
existing managers and thus will function as a manager-displacing bankruptcy regime.
276. In contemporary American bankruptcy scholarship, Thomas Jackson (and his frequent
co-author Douglas Baird) has argued most forcefully that bankruptcy is best justified as a
response to the collective action problems faced by a firm's widely-scattered creditors. See, e.g.,
THOMAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRuIrcy LAw (1986).
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B. Which System is Better? ComparingEx Ante and Ex Post
The likely stability of the American, Japanese, and German
corporate governance frameworks brings us to a question that has
lurked beneath the analysis almost from the beginning. Which of the
two frameworks is superior-or would some intermediate approach
prove more efficient than either ex ante or ex post governance?
While carefully hedging the comparisons, several of the initial
efforts to compare Japanese and German relational governance to the
Berle-Means corporation in the United States seemed particularly
enamored of the Japanese and German approach. 277 An important
attraction of large stakeholders is that they have a greater incentive
to engage in ongoing monitoring of managers than do American
shareholders.278 In addition, these stakeholders' ongoing relationships
with the firms may facilitate more extensive exchange of information
between the firms and the shareholders, and promote a long-term
focus not possible for market-driven American firms. In addition to
these advantages there is the attraction of manager-displacing
bankruptcy. Creditor control and the absence of a manager-oriented
reorganization option avoid the inefficiencies of the ex post American
reorganization process.
Given the influence wielded by relational creditors, the ex ante
system depends heavily on the effectiveness of banks and other large
stakeholders as monitors. Because banks are firms themselves, they
face their own agency costs. Even taking these factors into account,
however, banks may still play an important and valuable monitoring
role.279

Ex ante governance thus offers significant attractions as compared to the American system. Yet the Japanese and German approaches also have an important downside: both create powerful
incentives to avoid even beneficial risk-taking. 280 A firm's relational
277. For a similar reading of this work, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany,
Japan,and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 74 (1995) ("[d]espite some protestations of
agnosticism, [the tone of advocates of the political account of corporate governance] makes it
clear that they regard the American system.., as inferior") (citing, among others: Roe, Some
Differences, supra note 36, at 1997; Black, supra note 250, at 813-14; Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Institutions as RelationalInvestors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124,
127 (1994)).

278. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, supra note 2, at 11 ("[a]s long as the intermediaries'

debilities are not the same debilities afflicting the industrial firms in which they own
stock.., then there might be improvements").
280. Macey and Miller reach a similar conclusion. See Macey & Miller, supra note 277.
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bank is the first and most obvious source of this risk aversion.
Because Japanese and German banks, unlike their American counterparts, hold stock as well as debt, they theoretically could encourage
better decision making than a holder of stock or debt alone.21 In practice, however, banks tend to hold a much higher percentage of a firm's
debt than its stock, which gives them an incentive to eschew risk.212
The fact that the banks themselves are thinly capitalized reinforces
their aversion to risk.23
The other principal source of risk aversion is the firm's managers. Due to the substantial human capital stake they have in their
firms, managers have a natural tendency to avoid risk even apart
from the particular dynamics of ex ante governance. 284 The draconian
consequences of failure in the ex ante framework magnify this inclination. A manager who will immediately lose her job if the firm files for
bankruptcy, and who faces a notably thin managerial labor market, is
likely to view risk quite differently than one who operates in a more
forgiving system.
In contrast to ex ante governance, the ex post framework encourages a more sanguine approach to risk-taking. Because the
shareholders of U.S. firms tend to be diversified, they benefit if the
firm takes appropriate risks.28 While managers may be less anxious
to take risks, the active managerial markets and manager-driven

281. Interestingly, requiring managers to hold both stock and debt was the strategy Jensen
and Meckling suggested more than two decades ago as a way to address managerial agency
costs. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 352-54.
Based on a similar intuition, Hauswald argues that the German system, with mixed banking and a liquidation-based bankruptcy regime that makes loan agreements effectively renegotiation-proof, is superior to the American approach of limiting banks' ability to hold stock. See
Financial Contracting, supra note 66; Banking Systems, supra note 66. As the analysis below
suggests, however, this assumes that banks' stock and debt holdings are proportionate and
ignores the effect of agency costs on the bank itself.
282. See Macey & Miller, supra note 277, at 84-86 (Japan), 88-89 (Germany). One factor
Macey and Miller do not take into account is the fact that a bank's ongoing interest in its borrower's success gives it an equity-like stake in the borrower's future. This is true even if the
bank holds only or predominantly a debt interest, since the firm's future success means future
loans for the bank. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM.
L. REV. 901, 948-52 (1986) (characterizing relational bank's role as similar to a joint venturer).
283. An important feedback effect of ex ante governance is that it may also undermine
entrepreneurial activity. For evidence that venture capital providers in Japan are often affiliated with banks and securities firms, and tend to finance retail and real estate firms rather
than new technology, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States
and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate GovernanceDebate, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 865,874-80 (1997).
284. See Jensen & Meckling, supranote 16, at 354.
285. Shareholders' willingness to permit risk is a function of their diversification, together
with the effect limited liability has in controlling their downside risk. See Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liabilityand the Corporation,52 U. CHi. L. REV. 89 (1985).
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bankruptcy process-together with firms' increased use of stock-based
compensation-all work to align their perspectives with that of their
shareholders.
This is not to say that ex post is necessarily superior to ex ante
governance. Just as ex ante governance tends toward risk aversion, ex
post governance can encourage too much risk. Debtholders-the
initial losers if a firm's risk-taking turns out badly-constrain firms
through covenants. 286 But the covenants cannot be enforced if the
This, coupled with the fact that
firm files for bankruptcy.
shareholders often retain some of their interest in a reorganization,
8
can induce excessive risk, particularly as a firm nears insolvency.27
Neither the ex ante nor the ex post approach is inherently superior. Rather than anointing one or the other as preferable, it is
more useful to view them as alternative mechanisms for enhancing
going-concern value. From this perspective, the Japanese and
German approach tends to retain going-concern value within an existing firm. Once a firm is established, ex ante governance, with its longterm shareholders and comparatively cautious managers, stabilizes
the existing firm and strongly deters failure. Ex post governance, by
contrast, places far less emphasis on the existing firm. The marketdriven governance and amenability to failure of the ex post approach
facilitate the redeployment of existing assets. If stability is the
watchword of an ex ante system, ex post governance assumes a certain
288
amount of creative destruction.
286. The classic account of this is Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis ofBond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117 (1979).
287. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 441
(1992).

Recent empirical work on capital structure provides strong support for this view as to the
differential effects ofex ante and expost governance. Thus firms generally held much more debt
in the United States, which offers managers the possibility of ex post reorganization, than in

countries such as Germany that do not. See Rajan & Zingales, supranote 208, at 1445.
288. Ron Gilson has recently distinguished American and Japanese governance in someGilson characterizes corporate governance as a trade-off between
what similar terms.
"stability," which tends to support firm-specific investment, and "mutability," which enables
firms to respond quickly to changes in technology. Gilson, supra note 10, at 336. Gilson de-

scribes Japanese governance as biased toward stability and as a result best at adapting to niche
markets, whereas American governance emphasizes mutability and adapts better to change.
See id. at 340-42.
The same distinction can be made by analogy to evolutionary theory in biology.

Evolutionary biologists initially assumed that evolutionary success meant the survival of
individual organisms. In more recent years, this view has given way to the "selfish gene"
approach, which posits that evolutionary success consists of the successful transmission of

particular genes into subsequent generations, even if this entails high mortality for individual
organisms. See generally RIcHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989). From this perspective,

ex ante governance parallels an organism-based approach, and ex post governance a selfish gene
approach.
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The effectiveness of each approach depends on the parties'
success in counteracting its potential inefficiencies. In the United
States, contractual provisions such as bond covenants help limit
shareholder risk-taking.29 Important dangers with ex ante governance include excessive risk aversion, and diversion by concentrated
shareholders of private benefits to themselves. Bank shareholders'
shareholdings and their stake in the ongoing success of the firm may
partially counteract their risk aversion. 290 In Japan and Germany,
these factors, together with the threat of government intervention,
appear to be the principal check on the downsides of ex ante governance.

VI. CONCLUSION
An evolutionary theory of corporate governance and corporate
bankruptcy provides a more complete account of corporate law than
even the most sophisticated existing theories. Focusing on the United
States, Japan, and Germany, this Article has proposed that, at least
in countries with relatively stable property rights, a nation's corporate
governance and corporate bankruptcy approaches will invariably
prove complementary. By considering the evolutionary history of each
of the systems, particularly the ex post system in place in the United
States, we were able to see how different nations' corporate law
frameworks could diverge so dramatically, and to make predictions
about future developments.
Although the analysis focused on the polar cases of ex ante
(Japan, Germany) and ex post governance (United States), the theory
is fully applicable to other nations as well. Thus, in nations such as
Canada and Great Britain, where corporate governance is more relational than the United States but more market-driven than Japan

289. Notice that shareholders as well as bondholders benefit from provisions that limit the
agency costs of equity, since bondholders would otherwise demand higher interest rates to offset
the risk ofex post risk-taking by shareholders.
290. In contexts where the same institution does not serve both as the principal sharehold-

er and the principal debtholder, one might expect an increased concentration of shareholding to
provoke an analogous concentration in debtholding, since large creditors can more effectively
monitor a concentrated shareholder than scattered creditors. Stated differently, large creditors
have both a sufficient stake and sufficient access to information to counterbalance large shareholders. These factors help to explain both the tendency of closely held American firms to have
a single dominant creditor and the concentration of debt (which parallels the newly concen-

trated equity) in most leveraged buyout transactions.
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and Germany,2 91 there are also intermediate approaches to corporate
292
bankruptcy.
It is important not to overstate the importance of corporate law
in a nation's economic development. Technology and external price
shocks may prove far more important than corporate law in determining the success of a corporate enterprise. But at least on the margin,
the corporate law framework does make a difference-in the effect it
has on entrepreneurial activity and on the preservation of goingconcern values, for instance. So long as it does, it is important to
continue to refine our understanding of the corporate governance
293
patterns that have emerged in any given country.

291. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Brittania?: Institutional
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1997 (1994) (noting
shareholdings more concentrated in Britain than United States, but institutional shareholders

do not routinely monitor); Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 68, at 884-88 (describing
concentrated shareholdings in Canadian firms).
292. Thus, George Triantis' valuable work comparing bankruptcy in Canada and the
United States suggests the Canadian framework includes a genuine reorganization option but is
far more stringent about applying it. See Triantis, supra note 59; see also LoPucki & Triantis,
supranote 120. Consistent with this, one would expect to find that Canadian managers are less
highly paid than their American counterparts, that their pay is less likely to include a substantial performance-based component, and that Canadian firms include less debt in their capital
structures.
293. One important area for future refinement is to map more precisely the relationship
between private actors and representatives of governmental agencies. The theory could be
extended to governance systems where the government not only influences corporate governance, as in Japan and Germany, but exercises a direct ownership interest, as has been true in
France. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French
Enterprises (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing changes in French
governance). In such a governance system, corporate managers are likely to take on some of the
characteristics of agency bureaucrats.

